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Summary 
The thesis investigates perceptions of climate change (CC) among stakeholders within 
Norwegian and German energy sector, and the implications of climate perception for personal 
behaviour. The main focus of investigation is to examine how climate change is perceived in 
all its aspects: causes, consequences, measures, policies and the role of the individual 
confronted with its challenges. The background is to examine how the increasingly 
dramatised threat of climate change is received and treated by individuals who are daily 
employed with energy issues, as the energy sector represents one of the major challenges 
when it comes to solving the problem of climate change. Energy production based on fossil 
fuels is one of the major contributors to green house gas (GHG) emissions in the developed 
and newly developing countries, where 70% of the CO2 emissions emerge by the production 
and consumption of energy. Based on one of the core assumptions of institutional theory, 
which claims that institutions affect policy and hence the flow of history, the climate 
perceptions among these respondents may be a neglected factor in the account for the main 
obstacles to a transition of the current energy systems in Norway and Germany from a fossil-
fuel based into a renewable one.  
The thesis’ major theoretical approach is explanation-based theory, which emphasises 
the importance of studying (and comparing) cases within a context. A sample of twenty 
experts from public and private energy institutions in Norway and Germany was used as a 
case study. The public institutions present in the thesis are some of the central institutions 
within the energy sector in both countries. Their areas of responsibility reach from electricity 
production, power grids, and renewable energy to petroleum production. The private 
institutions are large scale energy companies involved in electricity and petroleum production. 
Qualitative interviews are used as the primary research method. A comprehensive 
literature review of official documents and previous research on the energy sector in Norway 
and Germany was nevertheless necessary to create a contextual background against which the 
empirical findings are analysed. In order to maintain the claim of full anonymity with respect 
to person and institution, the findings are analysed according to three groups of institutions. 
The first group consists of institutions that are primarily occupied with conventional energy – 
here defined as not (new) renewable energy – production, analysis and politics etc; the second 
includes institutions whose focus is more on renewable energy and climate policy. To 
simplify, I called them the public/energy group and the public/environment group. The private 
companies made up the last group; i.e. the private group. 
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The findings reveal that there are major disparities among the respondents’ climate 
and energy perceptions, and that group (and sector) belonging is more important for the 
interviewees’ CC perception and behaviour than their nationality. The public/energy group is 
mainly constituted of individuals that are sceptical about climate change and critical towards 
the official climate policies. They do not regard it as a personal responsibility to reduce GHG 
emissions individually, and have hence not undertaken measures to do so in their private 
lives. Contrary to the public/energy group, the public/environmental group reflects the 
outspoken political agenda and expresses confidence in the reports from the international 
panel on climate change (IPCC). The respondents in this group also stress the individual’s 
potential for action, and detail about their personal efforts to become more climate friendly. 
The private group interviewees are all clear that they regard the threat of climate change as 
real, but they are not as idealistic as the environmental group when it comes to undertake 
measures in their private lives.   
Even though the sample is too small to be generalised, the findings imply that the 
public/energy group may represent an obstacle for the implementation of major emission 
reduction measures in Norway and Germany. The fact that the public/energy and private 
group hold diverging climate perceptions opposes previous research that account for the 
historical inter-linkages between the two groups. This may be explained with the role of 
business and industry in the climate negotiations. Other studies have shown that private actors 
turned from being climate sceptical and lobbying against the creation of binding negotiations 
into being pro-climate after the signing of the Kyoto protocol. Another explanation can 
nevertheless be that the respondents from the public/energy group are the persons with the 
most knowledge about the actual potentials for energy saving, efficiency and development of 
renewable energy in Norway and Germany. Faced with the enormous challenge of reducing 
GHG emissions in our highly energy dependent societies, this may make them conclude that 
the task is infeasible and hence lead towards a denial of the anticipated climate crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
The public debate about global warming originated as early in the 1970’s as a result of the 
scientifically observed temperature increases, which were proportional with increased levels 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, above all CO2. During the last couple of years, the 
focus on climate change has increased remarkably. Parallel with changing weather and 
climate patterns all over the world – and enhanced possibilities to spread the news about these 
within a few seconds due to improved communication technologies – the scientific 
community has sharpened their warnings about the possible effects of continued and/or 
increased emission of green house gases (GHG) into the atmosphere. As a consequence, 
climate policy and international climate negotiations have grown into a comprehensive policy 
area, with the signing and ratification of the Kyoto protocol in 2005 as an important 
watershed.  
Even though the established scientific community – which bases its definition of 
scientific knowledge on the procedure of peer-reviewing – has stated that climate change 
(CC) is caused by human activity with 95% certainty (IPCC 2007a), there is still widespread 
discussion around whether climate change is “really” man-made or not and to what degree we 
will be able to stop it through changed behaviour. Disagreement and uncertainty within 
science is nothing particular for the case of climate change. Science always operates under 
certain degrees of uncertainty. For the case of CC, this uncertainty nevertheless becomes very 
evident as the stakes are very high. If the scientists are right, the implications for nature and 
people will be immense. The need for action would be urgent. The topic also provokes 
emotional reactions, as it concerns so many aspects of our society and our way of life.  
CC is a consequence of many different factors, including fossil fuel based energy 
production, agriculture, de-forestation, waste, and overpopulation. The challenges are hence 
of scientific as well as of political, social and economic character. I have chosen to take a 
closer look at climate perceptions of persons within the energy sector. This choice was made 
of the following reasons:  
1) Energy production based on fossil fuels is one of the major contributors to GHG 
emissions. In developed and newly developing countries, 70% of the CO2 emissions 
emerge by the production and consumption of energy. Schreyer & Mez argue that “it 
is evident that climate and energy policy are two sides of the same coin” (Schreyer & 
Mez 2008:20).   
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2) The projections from energy agencies (IEA 2006) on future energy demand predict an 
enormous growth in energy production and consumption within the next fifty years. 
The amount of GHG emissions from the energy sector represents a major challenge 
for the future.  
3) The potential for renewable energy production and energy efficiency is a controversial 
topic, and the development of alternative non-fossil fuel based energy sources relies 
heavily on political action and perceptions.  
Norway and Germany are among the industrial countries that have signed and ratified the 
Kyoto protocol, and hence responded to the challenges of climate change with official 
policies directed towards decreasing their GHG emissions.
1
 Their strategies for reaching their 
aims of emission reductions are nevertheless different, for several reasons. Above of all, they 
have very differently structured energy sectors, partly as a result of notable geographical 
differences. The sources of GHG emissions are correspondingly diverging. Even though 
Norway is granted with huge renewable energy resources, it will not reach its Kyoto aim in 
terms of domestic emission reduction, mainly because of the country’s petroleum production. 
The Norwegian Government has nevertheless promised to reduce the emissions by more than 
10% of its initial Kyoto obligations through financing reduction measures in developing 
countries.
2
 Germany is one of few Annex I countries in the Kyoto protocol that – with high 
probability – will achieve its proscribed target through domestic measures by 2012. This is to 
a large degree a result of the reorganisation of industry and energy production in what used to 
be the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Germany is also obliged to meet the 
European Union’s (EU) directive on renewable energy, which prescribes specific national 
aims for the development of renewable energy sources (RES) and energy efficiency. The RES 
sector is a major focus of the German authorities, and Germany has outspoken aims of 
becoming a world leading exporter of renewable energy and environmental technology.
3
 This 
has resulted in installation of new renewable energy production at a much higher rate than 
Norway during the last ten years. Norway’s focus has been on becoming an exporter of 
technology for capturing and sequestering CO2, and on donating money to save rainforest in 
other parts of the world.  
                                                 
1
 The industrial countries are in the Kyoto agreement classified as Annex I parties that have obliged themselves 
to binding emission reduction targets (UNFCCC 2008)  
2
 Emission reduction in developing countries is in the Kyoto protocol organised through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (UNFCCC 2008). 
3
 See for example http://www.german-renewable-energy.com/ (10.10.2008) 
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1.1 Climate change in a “fossilistic” age 
The German economist Altvater (2005) has termed the industrial age as a “fossilistic” one, 
because of its dependence on the combustion of fossil and non-renewable fuels; coal, oil and 
gas. According to Altvater, the current political and economical systems in the Western part 
of the world are based on – and only possible through – large-scale energy consumption. To 
denominate the age we live in from the main energy source may be controversial. Such a 
concept nevertheless illustrates the immense importance of a country’s energy structure – 
access, security and production, and that the energy structure is closely tied to the societal 
structure as such. The increasing consumption and dependence on fossil energy sources 
during the last 30 years may serve to confirm Altvater’s assumption (Scheer 2005). 
Correspondingly to the way Altvater links the combustion of fossil fuels to our 
political system, Sejersted (1999) perceives technology development as a political choice. He 
states that 
politics can and should be analysed at several levels. One perspective is to examine 
the existing institutional system and the possibilities within this system in a short 
time period. Another is to take a critical look at the system itself and the 
possibilities for changing it in a long term. 
A common perception in modern societies is that technology develops autonomously and that 
societies have to adjust to the technological development. This implies that social actors do 
not have much choice. However, recent studies of technology show that the technological 
development is not autonomous, but in several ways “social constructed” (Sejersted 1999:10-
11). Beck & Perrow (1995:122) argue that it is impossible to know in advance how modern 
complicated technological systems work. As a consequence, the development of some of 
these systems has to be carried through as full scale large experiments. According to 
Sejersted, the North Sea turned into such a large laboratory since the early 1970s, where new 
technology was developed through trying and failing (Sejersted 1999:22). Germany’s 
development of renewable energy is also a consequence of successful policy measures 
(Bechberger & Reiche 2006). These examples indicate how essential and powerful policy 
measures are.    
This implies that social and political relations play an important role in the field of 
technological development. The political impact can be through several channels. One is 
direct research funding. Another is the design of relevant laws and rules. Because of the 
influence political institutions have on the actual policy, March & Olson argue that the 
institutions are not only executors of a prescribed policy, but they have a certain degree of 
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autonomy in their policy making (March & Olson 1989). This means that beliefs, norms and 
rules within certain institutions are important for the construction of policy. Because of the 
role of institutions, this thesis investigates the perception of CC among leaders within some of 
the energy sector’s central institutions in Norway and Germany.  
To what extent it is feasible to transform the “fossilistic” age into a renewable one is 
impossible to forecast, as every energy scenario is nothing but a hypothesis. No one is able to 
estimate the potential or cost of traditional or renewable energies in 2025 or 2040 (Scheer 
2005:54). In my opinion, this makes it even more interesting to take a closer look on how the 
problem and challenges are perceived. The Thomas’ theorem states that if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences (Collins 1994:199). This implies that if 
the barriers to mitigating climate change and a shift in energy system are perceived as 
impossible to overcome, they will remain so.  
1.2 Research questions 
 
1. How do leaders within Norwegian and German energy sector perceive climate change 
– the threat, the debate and the policy?  
 
2. What are the impacts of climate perception for personal behaviour? 
 
The background for why I have chosen to focus on the energy sector is, as mentioned above, 
the significance of energy production and consumption in climate policy. The main objective 
of research question 1 is to investigate how leaders within energy sector institutions perceive 
the issue of CC in a broad perspective, including the possibility and necessity for a change in 
their country’s energy situation. I am interested in the perceptions, because perceptions 
influence how actors behave in different situations. If there is a belief that climate change is a 
large problem and that our behaviour matters, this might lead to a change in behaviour 
towards increased consciousness around energy use and GHG emissions. Research question 2 
endeavours at investigating how climate perception influences behaviour. The gathering of 
data is accomplished through qualitative interviews with leaders from private and public 
institutions within the energy sector. Since I will not be able to conduct observational studies, 
the information about the respondents’ behaviour is based on their own accounts given in the 
interviews. Because of the thesis’ comparative approach, research question 1 and 2 implies 
the following subsidiary goals: 
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a) the comparison of Norway and Germany 
b) the comparison of public and private energy institutions 
The comparison of two countries requires an extended account for the situation of the two 
countries energy and climate policies. I will analyse the responses against the background of 
the official energy policies in the respective countries. The choice to carry through a 
comparative analysis between Norway and Germany is made because both countries have met 
the climate challenge with offensive policies and strive to play an active role in the 
establishment of a new climate agreement for the post-Kyoto period. Even though their 
present per capita GHG emissions are fairly equal, their energy situations are very different, 
and so is their sectoral potential for emission reductions. It is striking that Germany has 
introduced a more ambitious climate policy than Norway. Both countries are nevertheless far 
from a transition into a renewable energy age. The comparison is also made because I was 
curious to see whether the differences in national policies are reflected in the interviewees’ 
perception of the topic. Research questions 1 and 2 have hence an individual as well as a 
contextual dimension.  
 
After the field work was accomplished, I saw the need for establishing an additional research 
question: 
 
3. What are the historical relationships between public and private actors within the 
energy sector in Norway and Germany? 
 
The object of investigation is here the interaction between public and private institutions 
within the energy sector since the sector’s origin. The analysis is focused on the role of the 
state in the development of the energy sector. As stated earlier in the introduction, abatement 
of GHG emissions will most probably depend on a reorganisation of the energy sector. In line 
with this assumption, research question 3 also serves to shed light on the role of politics in 
technology development. A historical review of Norway and Germany’s energy sectors 
further serves to establish a context within which the empirical findings will be analysed. This 
corresponds with one of the core assumptions of explanation-based theory, which emphasises 
the importance of studying and comparing social regularities within a context (see chapter 2). 
Research question 3 represents a macro level focus, and the analysis is carried out on the basis 
of literary sources, in contrast to the previous two research questions which are based on 
empirical findings from qualitative interviews. 
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1.3 Confining the topic  
A country’s energy policy is a vast field, and it is impossible to cover all of it. It ranges from 
power production, supply, consumption and activities in the petroleum sector to coal mining 
and fuel provision for transport means. This thesis’ empirical part concentrates on actors 
operating in the electricity and petroleum sector. The companies from the private sector are 
companies above all engaged in electricity production. The public sector institutions 
represented in the sample are a more mixed bag. They do not exclusively work with topics 
related to electricity supply; there are also representatives from fossil fuel research or 
administrative institutions. The representatives from public sector work with climate policy, 
electricity provision, petroleum production and energy policy in general.  
In order to establish a context for the comparative analysis of the empirical findings, I have 
chosen to give a general account of both countries’ energy and climate policies, I would like 
to stress that this part serves as a contextual background and is not an exhaustive account for 
the topic. This is also the case for the historical review of and public-private inter-linkages 
within Norwegian and German energy sector. I do not aim at giving a detailed account for the 
political and legal processes behind the energy sector development. The objective is to present 
an overview of the main tendency in both countries.  
  Neither will I give an account for the potential of different renewable energy sources 
and their development. Many authors have written about this topic.
4
 Such an account would 
have served to illustrate the huge disparities and uncertainties in the prognoses. 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
In this introductory chapter I have presented the research topic and linked the problem of CC 
to the organisation of our current energy system. I emphasise why the energy sector is 
important when it comes to reducing GHG emissions, which serves to justify my choice of 
research question, sample and methodology. In the second chapter I will present the 
theoretical positions that are drawn on during the thesis, of which the explanation-based 
approach is the most fundamental. Contributions from institutional and rational choice theory 
serve to explain different aspects of the main empirical findings. The third chapter accounts 
for the choice of method applied in this thesis, my fieldwork and methodological limitations. 
Chapter four and five build the macro part of the thesis and create a contextual background 
against which the empirical results are analysed. In chapter four, I give a short introduction to 
                                                 
4
 See for example Hennicke & Fischedick (2007), Schreyer & Mez (2008) and Fornybar energi (2007). 
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the two countries present in the study, and I also present the predicted consequences of CC for 
each country according to the InterGovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This is 
followed by an account for the present climate and energy policies in Norway and Germany. 
The fifth chapter investigates the inter-linkages between public and private institutions within 
the energy sector. In chapter six the empirical findings are presented and organised into three 
groups of analysis. In chapter seven I discuss possible explanations for the empirical results, 
and some of the explanations are linked to the findings from the macro part. Finally in the 
eighth chapter I account for the main findings of the thesis.    
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2 Theory 
In this chapter, I account for the basic principles of the main theoretical positions in this 
thesis. Explanation-based theory makes out the basis theoretical framework around which the 
thesis’ research design is constructed. This includes a presentation of previous research 
relevant for this thesis research questions, the so-called local research frontier. I also give an 
account of institutional theory and rational choice theory, as they contribute with additional 
explanatory factors made use of in the discussion part.  
2.1 Explanation-based theory 
This thesis starts out taking the position of an explanation-based notion of theory to analyse 
and categorise its empirical findings. Mjøset (2004) writes about such theory: 
By explanation-based theory we refer to a cluster of notions that conceives theory 
as knowledge accumulated from the explanation of specific cases. These notions all 
fit the contextualist attitude: there is no objection to generalization, but 
explanation-based theories generalize without loss of context and with explicit 
reference to research questions reflecting participation in society. This is different 
from pure induction from passive, non-communicative observation. The term 
explanation here does not refer to the natural science ideal of explanation by laws, 
but rather to explanation as a conjunction of specific factors, as conceived in the 
models of historical, narrative explanations. 
Explanation-based theory is thus not one unified theory that one wants to “use” or “test” in 
the scientific work, in contrast to the various high level top-down notions of theory that are 
modelled on either natural science or social philosophy, which aims at developing a 
generalised model or perspective of social reality. Because the latter are based on top-down 
deductions, such high level theories are often weak when it comes to explanation. 
Explanation-based theories are less ambitious about the construction of overall social theory. 
Instead, it draws on previous research on similar cases, also known as the local research 
frontier (see below). As is the case for all theory, explanation-based theory is closely related 
to methods of developing knowledge about social phenomena and social fields. Ragin (1992) 
describes the appropriate method as a back and forth process between earlier theories relevant 
to the research question, referred to as frames, and new images that the new findings discover. 
“To the extent images lead to new frames, new theory is established” (Mjøset 2004). One of 
the most famous examples of explanation-based theory is Grounded Theory (GT). The notion 
of GT was developed by Glaser and Strauss from the Chicago school that flourished in the US 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Ethno-methodology and network theory are other conceptions that fit 
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the notion of explanation-based theory. Behind the idea of GT lies the presumption that one 
has to study and understand social life in its context. No social fact makes any sense 
abstracted from its context in social (and often geographic) space and social time. Social facts 
are located (Abbott 1997). Thus, individuals have to be observed, treated and analysed as 
actors in social relations. Social structures are regarded as a “set of temporary stabilities in 
process of flux and reciprocal determination” (Abbott 1997:1158). They are not something 
fixed and unchangeable, and must therefore be seen in light of their contemporary time and 
location. This again implies that 1) in contrast to a natural science ideal of theory 
development, experiment is impossible and 2) in contrast to a social philosophical ideal of 
theory, where generalisation of social facts over time and space is only possible to a very 
limited degree. Whereas the first notion of theory is oriented towards the need to model on the 
basis of given assumptions and the latter is driven by its wish/need to develop so called grand 
theory, GT is rather problem-oriented. One starts out with a problem with social and/or 
political relevance and explores reality by going out in the field and proceeds to enhance as 
much information relevant for the research problem and all involved parts. Before or during 
the field studies, one relates to different local research frontiers to get an overview as 
comprehensive as possible of different aspects of the field, accumulated by previous research. 
One nevertheless keeps the exploring attitude, as advocates for GT argue that only by starting 
out with such an attitude we are able to learn something new (Mjøset 2004). Empirical 
findings are then used to develop new terms – which is the basis for new theory. It would 
nevertheless not be correct to claim that I have conducted a grounded theory study. This 
would need a far more comprehensive field work where I spend more time with the 
interviewees, not only talking to them but observing the setting in which they are operating. It 
would not be possible within the frames of this thesis, but as a further work it would be 
interesting for future research to broaden the scope on societal aspects of energy use and 
strategies for mitigation and adaptation to climate change.  
2.1.1 The local research frontier (LRF) 
A critique that has been raised against grounded theory and explanatory-based theory is that it 
prescribes that the researcher starts out his field studies with a blank and unbiased attitude, 
which is considered an illusion. (Mjøset 2007:348) This is a false understanding of what its 
adherents strive at. Instead of basing their work on a constructed high-level theory based on a 
set of given assumptions/corollaries, explanatory-based studies define their problem 
formulations on earlier and related research within the same field. Mjøset (2007:349) terms 
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this the local research frontier. The LRF emerges as many researches ask the same research 
questions with reference to similar sets of data and other empirical investigation. In this 
respect, LRF synthesize existing analyses from research on many cases (Mjøset forthcoming). 
To be able to conduct an analysis as innovative and true as possible, the researcher needs to 
trace the frontiers relevant for her study. My study touched upon several fields and relates to 
several LRFs. As known to me, there are no other studies that have investigated perception of 
climate change among leaders within a sector directly connected to climate change. In this 
respect, I started out on bare ground. I will now give a short presentation of the findings from 
other researches working on similar research problems, accumulated within different 
disciplines: psychology, history, sociology, political science and others. The need for 
narrowing my research question and subsequent analysis led to the choice of relating my work 
to two LRFs in particular:  
1) The frontier concerning lay people’s perception of CC, which consists mainly 
of contributions from sociology and psychology.  
2) The study of actors within the public-private energy (and to a certain degree 
environmental) bureaucracy. This frontier rests mainly on contributions from 
political science, sociology and journalistic work.  
Other frontiers that could have been interesting to scrutinize more in depth are among others 
3) the role and occurrence of expert knowledge, advocated within the tradition of sociology of 
professions, 4) the frontier occupied with “varieties of capitalism”, i.e. the comparison of 
political systems in the countries present in my case study, and 5) the tradition drawing on 
findings from social psychology mainly aimed at studying phenomena concerning group 
influence/pressure, influence from the media, techniques to manage contradictory information 
etc.
5
  
 The research on perception of CC is manifold and increasing. Many researchers have 
been occupied with how the problem and threat of CC is received and interpreted in the 
population. Most of this research aims at investigating lay people’s perception of CC. 
Norgaard is an environmental sociologist that has conducted a study on perception of CC in a 
small Norwegian city based on field studies during 2000 and 2001. Her main finding is that 
even though people were aware of the causes of global warming they chose to ignore it. She 
argues that her findings presents evidence that nonattention to CC in her case study was a 
matter of denial, and identifies this denial as a socially organized process (Norgaard 2006). 
                                                 
5
 I do not have the capacity to elaborate more detailed on this local frontiers, but acknowledge that it could be 
interesting to relate further research on the topic to them. 
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Norgaard identifies the most frequent arguments justifying nonattention given by her 
interviewees as “perspectival selectivity”, a term established by Rosenberg (1991). It refers to 
“the angle of vision that one brings to bear on certain events” (1991:134). The perspectival 
selectivity was used to minimize Norwegian responsibility for CC, and hence to create what 
Opotow & Weiss (2000) call “denial of self-involvement”.  
Sørensen
 6
 has interviewed both lay people and scientists in Norway about their view 
on climate change. One of their main findings was that lack in political will leads to climate 
scepticism in the population. They found that the general attitude among non-experts is that 
they do not believe climate change can be that dangerous as predicted from the climate 
researchers, because if it really was that dangerous, the politicians would have taken action 
and done something about it.  
Weber (2008) has carried through both qualitative focus interviews and quantitative 
analyses of statistical surveys to examine perception of climate change in the German 
population. Her work reveals that lay people describe CC as one of the most important 
environmental problem, which they worry about. At the same time, they do not experience it 
as a personal risk or threat, as they do not believe CC will have direct consequences for 
themselves. For the German population, CC is still too far away – in space and time – to 
trigger personal worry. The Germans argue that they are not threatened by CC themselves, in 
contrast to the poor population in developing countries. Nature and wildlife is also perceived 
as threatened which does not have consequences for a largely urbanised German population. 
Weber argues that the perception of CC among her respondents reflects the media debate and 
the medial description of the problem. Another important finding is that the so-called climate 
sceptisists’ arguments do not find support among lay Germans. Even though the Germans see 
the necessity of acting in order to reduce GHG emissions, they are not ready to undertake 
substantial measures themselves as long as a “third part”, i.e. fellow citizens, industry, other 
countries, remains passive. In this respect, they perceive institutional actors as the 
Government and the industry as responsible for solving the problem (Weber 2008:235-237). 
Weber’s qualitative research suggests that CC is perceived as a far-reaching crisis, but not 
handled as such. This corresponds to Sørensen’s findings of Norwegian climate perception: 
The problem is not dealt with as one would expect the dealing with a comprehensive societal 
crisis.   
                                                 
6
 There is no publication from Sørensen’s project available yet. Information from a fact sheet from the 
Norwegian Research Council: http://www.forskningsradet.no/NORKLIMA (21.09.2008) 
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Even though the study of perception of climate change among experts in the energy 
sector is poorly investigated, the study of interaction within and between the institutions 
present in my thesis is a beloved object of political scientists, sociologists, historians and 
others. This research area constitutes in this respect a local research frontier in a broader 
sense. I will account more detailed for this LRF in chapter 5. Several contributions to this 
LRF relate their work to Institutional theory. I will now give a brief introduction to the main 
principles of historical-institutional theory, and also give examples of other studies on 
environmental policy that endorse its assumptions.  
2.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory is a theoretical tradition within both political science and sociology – as 
far as it makes sense to draw a distinction between those two disciplines. Institutional theories 
stress the importance of institutions within the making of politics as they see politics as 
conspicuously influenced by the institutional structures within which politics occur (March & 
Olsen 1989).The classical sociologists were occupied with the nature of institutions in modern 
society from the beginning. Weber wrote extensively on bureaucracy (see for example Weber 
1990). In his view, the ideal-type of rational-legal bureaucracy is a distinctive feature that 
characterises the development of western societies compared to previous civilisations. Weber 
posited a direct link between cultural values and formal structures in society, including formal 
institutions. One of Weber’s observations regarding the bureaucracy was its permanent 
character: “An accomplished bureaucracy belongs to the kind of social structures that are 
most difficult to destroy” (Weber 1990:141). According to Weber, the bureaucracy – defined 
as the system of formal public institutions to execute the tasks of the national state – is build 
upon the principles of purposive rationality (Zweckrationalität). In other words, the 
bureaucracy is an institutionalisation of this type of rationality. He nevertheless does not deny 
the informal features existent in every organisation, but it is not in his interest and purpose to 
investigate them. Rather, he aims at pointing out the main characteristics of modernity’s 
bureaucracy (Fivelsdal 1990:x). This can explain why bureaucracies tend to be forces for 
conservatism in different policy areas. Durkheim referred to sociology as the “science of 
institutions” (Peters 2004:110). His analysis focused more on how objective societal facts 
were converted into symbolic systems that represented collective values for institutions. 
Selznick was interested as much in the process of institutionalisation as in the institutions that 
result from that process (Peters 2005:110). His work and the work of his students reinforced 
the point that institutions have a capacity to defend their core values. They also emphasised 
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the importance of maintaining routines and processes in the face of the challenges that 
confront any organization or institution.  
 Political science’s institutional theory rests to a large degree on sociological tradition. 
Even though the roots of political science are in the study of institutions, institutional theory 
was largely neglected by the discipline’s scholars from the 1950s until the beginning of the 
1980s when “new institutionalism” came into existence. Among the most important scholars 
within new institutionalism were March and Olsen, who named the movement (Peters 
2005:16). The re-emergence of institutionalism in political science was to a large degree a 
reaction to the increasing rationalisation and individualisation of the discipline’s theoretical 
perspectives, dominated by rational choice theory (see chapter 2.3) and social psychology. 
The focus of analysis had been on the input to Governments and on the distributive effects of 
Governmental actors. Institutional relations and governance itself was not regarded as an 
important factor and hence not offered much attention (Skocpol 1985). The renewed attention 
to institutions represented a shift in research object. Focus moved from a particular decision 
process to the institutional establishments that give these processes meaning (Olsen 1989:30).  
By taking on an institutional approach, one regards institutions as arenas for contending social 
forces, and as collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and 
defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs. (March & Olsen 1989:21-6) This rests 
on an assumption that institutions often can be analysed as a collective acting coherently, 
which makes it possible to treat institutions as political actors. The approach also presumes 
that institutionally determined patterns of thinking and acting are more typical for political life 
than rational decisions. According to institutional theory: 
… political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or instead 
of, by calculated interest; politics is organized around the construction and 
interpretations of meaning as well as, or instead of, the making of choices; routines, 
rules and forms evolve through history-dependent processes that do not reliably 
and quickly reach unique equilibria; the institutions of politics are not simple 
echoes of social forces; and the polity is something different from, or more than, an 
arena for competition among rival interests. In short, the organization of political 
life makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history (March & Olson 
1989:159). 
The institutional perspective is not a uniform theory (Peters 2005, Reitan 1998:18). It 
nevertheless bases on the definition of institutions as consisting of cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour 
(Scott 1995:33). Advocates of institutional theory point to a degree of institutional autonomy 
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which is necessary to establish that political institutions are more than mirrors of social forces 
(March & Olsen 1989:18).  
The most important division within institutional theory is above all that between 
rational institutionalism on the one hand and new-institutionalism on the other. The former 
emphasises the institutional framework and the fact that laws, rules and norms define the 
actors’ scope of behaviour. This perspective presumes that institutions modify behaviour 
through rules and formal structures without changing basic values and interests. The latter 
claims that the institutions develop moral and cognitive structures. They therefore also shape 
and change actors’ values and world-views. New-institutionalist theorists also argue that 
institutions influence behaviour as they constitute terms and categories in which individuals 
interpret reality (Reitan 1998:20). New institutionalism argue that actors within institutions 
are socialised to follow the “logic of appropriateness”, and into acting in ways which are 
consistent with the overall objective and culture of the institution. When facing a set of action 
possibilities, the actors evaluate 1) what type of situation they are facing, 2) what are their 
main identity in the situation and 3) what kind of behaviour is expected from me or the 
institution I represent in this situation? The final action choice is decided by one’s perception 
of the institution’s rules and norms about the correct action appropriate for one’s identity and 
task in the given situation (March & Olsen 1998:21-6).  
The sociologists DiMaggio and Powell can also be placed in the new-institutionalist 
tradition. They have nevertheless criticised the political scientists for putting too much 
emphasis on identification and internalisation (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:15) Instead, they 
argue that the institutions’ cognitive aspects are decisive for individuals’ and organisations’ 
perception of reality. In this respect, their contribution largely draws on the social 
constructivist tradition (Reitan 1998:19; Peters 2005:113). I am uncertain whether their point 
of view really differs from the one advocated by March & Olsen, except for that they simply 
put more weight on how the members of an institution perceive situations within their 
structure. Most important is that the new-institutionalists’ accounts of institutions are in direct 
opposition to the rationalistic roots of rational choice theory (Peters 2005:121). 
Previous research relevant for this thesis that stands in the institutional tradition is 
among others Reitan’s study on Norwegian environmental policy during the 1980s (pollution 
policy) and 1990s (climate policy). Confining the analysis entity to the political and 
administrative system of governance, she investigated how institutional features influences 
policy making. Some of her findings and can be seen as evidence for the new-institutional 
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perspective as she argues that cognitive structures within institutions are important to 
understand policy making in her cases (Reitan 1998:21).   
Another study that implicates the relevance of institutional theory for the energy sector 
is Jelstad’s study of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Statoil. One of her findings is 
that the environmental strategy within the firm partly is a result of internal values and norms 
around social responsibility that to a large degree reflects national (Norwegian) norms and 
values. Jelstad argues that the company’s environmental strategy is above all a consequence 
of formal demands from Norwegian authorities, but internal pressure was also a factor that 
gradually made the Executive Board change its attitude (Jelstad 2005:76). The importance of 
the institution’s internal culture for the development of a CSR strategy stands in line with the 
assumptions of new institutionalism. 
2.2.1 The theory of the segmented state7 
Research that aligns with the institutional tradition has revealed that the design of public 
policy is much more than formal resolutions. Decision makers rarely possess a full account of 
all possible alternatives for action, their consequences, the connection between the 
consequences and different aims. What aims will be prioritised is to a high degree influenced 
by the existence of appropriate measures. The design of measures depends both on where 
different institutions seek information as well as on who are offering information and 
solutions to the problems (Olsen 1978:37). The scope of action and choice is not solely 
connected to the Parliament. Sometimes, interest organisations are given authority for 
decision making. In an increasing number of domains and cases, the public administration 
influence policy. The reason is that it matters how regulations, rules and decisions are worked 
out (Olsen 1978:38). 
Segmentation rests on an assumption that politicians, administrative actors and interest 
organisations within different sectors constitute systems for decision making. The most 
important distinctions in politics will be between different fields of cases, around which a 
segment emerges (Reitan 1998:25). A segment may for example be organised around a 
specific type of industry policy or around functions such as health services, transport or 
energy. Members of each segment belong to different institutions, and there is not necessarily 
agreement within each segment. The members nevertheless share basic values and 
                                                 
7
 The theory of the segmented state is developed on the basis of an analysis of Norwegian conditions. Its 
counterparts in the international literature are theories on policy network and policy communities (see for 
example Smith (1993). I have nevertheless chosen to give an account for the segmented state theory, as I 
consider it as applicable on the study of German circumstances as well.   
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perceptions. Interaction within a segment can be exemplified by a statement made by a state 
secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, stressing that the best way for organised 
interest groups to influence the Ministry is by influencing the motivations of the minister’s 
leading advisors (statssekretærer) (Egeberg et al 1978:123). In line with such a description of 
the political system, important tasks will be to map out 1) the most important segments and 
what resources, measures and possibilities for sanction they posses 2) the network between 
segments and 3) the strength relationship between the segments (Egeberg et al 1978:124).  
The methodological choice made in this thesis of confining the sample to members of 
the public administration and private companies can be justified with the assumptions of 
theory of segmented state. A perspective assuming a segmentation of public and private 
institutions can be fruitful to understand interaction between institutions in different sectors. 
Such a theory describes the political system as a collection of segments or areas for decision 
making (Egeberg et al 1978:122). A complete study of the energy segment would 
nevertheless require the inclusion of politically chosen members of the Parliament and 
Departments in the sample. This is not possible within the scope of this thesis.     
2.3 Rational choice theory 
The rational (also sometimes called utilitarian) tradition has its roots back to Jeremy Bentham 
and Adam Smith. It has above all been important within the discipline of economics, where it 
is still considered as the prevailing basic theory. Also within the sociological, political science 
and philosophical traditions, the theory usually known as rational choice has played a central 
role since the 1950s (Collins 1994:121). In the following, I will concentrate on the tradition’s 
main contributions within political science.  
Whereas institutional theory rests on the assumption that actors act according to a 
“logic of appropriateness”, rational choice theory claim that individuals and institutions are 
rationally calculating actors. Instead of focusing on the institutional culture and the impact of 
social features on behaviour, the preferences of political actors are perceived as exogenous to 
the political process. They are shaped by forces beyond the concern of the immediate choice 
situation (Peters 2005:26). The focus of analysis is therefore to understand how actors are 
motivated to do what they do (Collins 1994:124). Simplified, members of the institution act in 
accordance with the option that brings the less possible costs and the highest possible utility, 
based on an estimation of costs and gains related to different choices.  
One study that in a certain extent draws on the rational choice perspective is 
Vormedal’s (2008) analysis of the role of business and industry in the climate negotiations. 
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Vormedal argues that private actors turned from being climate sceptical and lobbying against 
the creation of binding negotiations into being pro-climate after the signing of the Kyoto 
protocol. Her findings support the assumption that business and industry, represented by 
business and industry NGOs in the negotiations, are driven by rational considerations of what 
is the most profitable strategy in a market perspective (Vormedal 2008). This endorses the 
conception of private companies as rationally calculating actors.  
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3 Method 
To be able to answer the primary research questions, this thesis makes use of a qualitative 
method for the gathering of empirical data. A qualitative approach is characterised by special 
attention to details and closeness to the informants (Thagaard 1998). This was important for 
me, in order to grasp as many aspects of the respondents’ climate perceptions as possible. In 
addition, I conducted a considerable text analysis, in line with the explanation-based 
theoretical approach accounted for in chapter two. In the following section, I account for the 
methodological aspects connected to the thesis’ empirical part.  
3.1 Why interviews? 
The qualitative research interview attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ point 
of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences and uncover their lived world prior to 
scientific explanations (Kvale 1996:1). The qualitative interview was therefore a natural 
choice for the gathering of data about my topic, as I was aiming at grasping the interviewees’ 
subjective opinion on CC. The issue of climate change is to a large degree the risk of climate 
change. Firstly because its major consequences will occur in the future. Secondly because of 
the uncertainties in the predictions. Beck (2007) points to the constructivist aspect of risks, 
and argues that the risks are a result of constructions and definitions and takes the form of a 
type of knowledge. The risks can hence be dramatised, modified and altered according to 
which norms that decides what is perceived as knowledge or not-knowlegde. In this regard, 
the risks are products of definition struggles (Beck 2007:66). Although scientists observe 
changed weather and temperature patterns all over the world, the major problems connected 
to global warming still takes form as anticipated risks located in the future. Even changing 
weather events have to be interpreted and placed in a climate context to be understood and 
perceived as a climate risk. This interpretation largely depends on expert or scientific 
knowledge. The risk is hence created and mediated through social discourse. A substantial 
part of the empirical work was to elaborate on the interviewees’ risk perceptions of climate 
change.   
The wish to investigate climate change perceptions originated from what I identify as 
two interdependent attitudes that I frequently observed both in the public debate and in 
personal discussions with colleagues and friends before I started the work with this thesis. The 
first attitude is the assumption that 
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A) “Most people” will not take action against CC as long as industry and 
authorities appear unwilling to undertake sufficient measures.  
This attitude is among the findings of Sørensen’s study (see chapter 2). Weber (2008) also 
found the opinion among respondents in her focus group studies that “the state and industry 
actors have to take action first”. This attitude made me curious to study personal behaviour 
among representatives from policy and industry strata who work directly or indirectly with 
climate related topics in their professional life. The second attitude is the widespread position 
that  
B) “What I do personally does not matter for the climate anyway” 
This attitude represents a more general moral philosophical problem. In economic terms, it 
occurs because individuals do not have an incentive to act as their private cost of action is 
higher than their share of dispersed benefits. This results from the fact that climate is a ”global 
public good”: Nobody can be excluded from its effects and there is no rivalry in consumption. 
It is true that what every one of us does have microscopic consequences for climate change. If 
we as individuals save a few kilos CO2 it is futile when the rest of the world continues with 
business-as-usual and the overall emissions keep increasing. Attitude B is nevertheless 
familiar with the problem outlined by Hardin (1968) in his famous article “Tragedy of the 
Commons”. Hardin describes how multiple individuals acting independently in their own self-
interest can ultimately destroy a shared resource even where it is clear that it is not in 
anyone’s interest for this to happen. He argues that the problem has no technical solution, but 
“requires a fundamental extension in morality”.  
To illustrate the importance of individual behaviour, Michaelis (2003) states that the 
fastest growing causes of environmental damage and resource use in industrialised countries 
are directly linked to households, lifestyles and consumption, and concludes that individuals 
play a significant role in turning our lifestyles into more sustainable ones. Hovden (2005) has 
on the other hand conducted field studies in West Norway where he finds that households 
with an outspoken environmental commitment do not necessarily have a lower energy and 
resource consumption. This is due to the fact that there are many things everybody has to do, 
like heating the house, showering, driving the children to nursery school and to work and so 
on. In addition, he found that the environmentalists more often went for holiday to exotic 
places, which implies large environmental impacts. Hovden argues that the environmentalists’ 
most important contribution to “environmental-friendliness” is their political support for 
structural changes and by accepting changed frame conditions in favour of increased 
environment protection. Most scenarios developed to explore the potential for a sustainable 
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future nevertheless conclude that a combination of technological and lifestyle changes will be 
required (Michaelis 2003). This makes implicates that the individual is not without 
responsibility and agency, even in a world where cause and effect of individual behaviour 
may be globalised and therefore invisible. Beck (2007) argues that global environmental 
problems are one of many side effects of the industry society that are contributing to “a meta 
transformation of society” in the 21st century. Many authors have requested a “new future 
oriented global ethics of responsibility” in response to this transition (Beck 2007:41). If the 
previous argumentation is accepted, it is obvious that attitude B is an example of the 
perspectival selectivity accounted for in chapter two. According to this mechanism, the 
individual chooses to take in a point of view convenient for her in the given situation.   
3.1.1 Climate perception and behavioural intentions 
When I say climate perception, I mean perceptions that regard all aspects of climate change 
perceptions touched upon in the interview. I hence understand both the perception of 
scientific prognoses, the assessment of climate policy and the perceptions’ implication for 
personal responsibility and individual “climate” behaviour as part of the interviewees’ climate 
perception. 
It is important to stress the fact that I did not ask each respondent directly about his or 
her actual behaviour. My questions was formulated more generally and encouraging the 
interviewees to talk about how they integrated climate protection in their everyday lives. I 
also asked about behaviour in their social surroundings, and posed some questions regarding a 
different, hypothetical situation. O’Connor et al (1999) suggests the term behavioural 
intention as the allusions to engage in environmental friendly behaviour and support 
Governmental environmental initiatives. Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) (in Michaelis (2003)) offer 
substantial research evidence that behavioural intentions and actual behaviours are highly 
correlated.  
3.1.2 Choice of sample 
My sample consists of people who work within different institutions, whose work field is that 
of energy production or administration in Norway and Germany. I have chosen this sample 
for specific reasons: 
1) Global warming is directly linked to energy consumption, because the major part of 
energy production in the world is based on combustion of fossil fuel (see chapter 1)  
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2) I am interested in how conscious people that work with energy in their professional life 
are about climate change.  
3) The interviewees will be working closer to the decision processes concerning energy than 
most other people in the society. Some of them may even influence the making of policy 
directly or indirectly. In accordance with institutional theory (see chapter 2), experts 
within the political system develop and shape the understanding of policy issues and 
alternatives (Heclo 1974). Industry representatives often influence through lobby activity 
(see chapter 2 and 5).  
4) I want to investigate how people that are aware of the problem of CC respond to it. 
Existing research assumes that a lack of information about the causes of global warming 
is the primary reason for the public’s failure to respond (Norgaard 2006). By interviewing 
experts in the energy sector, I assume that the interviewees will be well informed on the 
topic. The focus may hence be on how the interviewees respond to information about CC 
instead of investigating whether they possess this information or not. 
 
The sample consists of 20 persons, ten Norwegians and ten Germans. In Norway, there were 
five men and five women. In Germany, there were one woman and nine men. The public 
institutions represented in the sample are some of the central institutions within the energy 
sector in both countries. Their areas of responsibility reach from electricity production, power 
grids, and renewable energy to petroleum production. The private institutions are large scale, 
market dominating energy companies involved in electricity and petroleum production. I 
aimed at talking to people that were experts and held leading positions. The majority of the 
sample consists of leaders on intermediate level. Most of the interviewees are trained 
economists, but there are also engineers, geologists, political scientists and biologists 
represented in the sample.  
To ensure the full anonymity of each interviewee, I will not give a list of which 
institutions that are represented in my study. To be able to analyse the empirical findings, I 
have decided to group the different institutions according to their main area of activity and 
responsibility. The public sector is divided in two groups. The first consists of institutions 
mainly occupied with what I call traditional energy, defined as fossil, nuclear and large scale 
hydro energy. The second group consists of institutions whose area of responsibility is also 
energy production, but directed towards the development of new renewable energy (RES), i.e. 
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renewable energy exclusive large scale hydropower.
8
 To simplify, I call them the 
public/energy group and the public/environment group. The last group is called the private 
group and consists of the private energy companies whose core business activity is traditional 
energy production. The German energy companies are mainly hard coal, lignite and nuclear 
power energy producers, but they also have a minor share of RES in their production. The 
Norwegian energy companies are primarily producers of petroleum and hydropower. For the 
analysis, the interviewees are given fictitious names, but their gender is kept authentic. 
Table 1: The distribution of interviewees 
 NORWAY GERMANY 
PUBLIC/ENERGY GROUP 4 interviewees 3 interviewees 
PUBLIC/ENVIRONMENT GROUP 3 interviewees 4 interviewees 
PRIVATE GROUP 3 interviewees 3 interviewees 
 
3.1.3 Getting access 
The contact was established through e-mail, where I sent a description of the project and 
emphasised that participation was voluntary and would take place on an anonymous basis. If I 
had not received a response within a week, I followed up with a phone call. I tried to get 
people from as comparable positions and institutions in Norway and Germany as possible. In 
the private sector, it was more difficult for me to choose the interview objects myself. First of 
all, I did not have the overview over each company’s organisation structure, and I could not 
always figure out who held which positions. Secondly, when the receiver in the company read 
my research description, my request was often forwarded to a person in the company who 
worked with climate policy or renewable energies. To ensure that the private sector was 
presented in my sample at all, I accepted this and made sure that I got employees with similar 
positions and work areas from all the companies. Even though the private group consists of 
companies whose main business activities are traditional energy, the majority of the interview 
objects in this group are occupied with climate and/or RES strategies. This may have 
implications for the findings, and further research on the topic would be necessary to confirm 
if the perception of the group is valid for the companies in general. The question of validity 
                                                 
8
 In order to separate large scale hydropower, which is a well-established commercial technology, from all other 
renewable energy technologies, the latter are denoted as “new renewable energy technologies”. These are e.g.:  
solar energy – photovoltaics and solar collectors, bioenergy, windpower, salt power, tidal power and geothermal 
energy.  
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applies for all groups, because of the small size of the sample, and will be commented on 
below.  
There was substantial difference in how difficult it was to get access between countries 
and sectors. In general, the private sector responded quite fast and we could easily make out 
an appointment. When it concerned the public sector, it was much easier for me to get access 
in Germany than in Norway. In Germany, I was allowed to speak to almost all the people I 
wanted to, except of one interviewee who was sick. In this case, I talked to her subordinate. 
The Norwegians were notably more sceptical towards participating in the research project. 
Some of the level two leaders I contacted either neglected to answer me at all, or they wrote 
back that they could or would not prioritise this in a manner that was strikingly impolite. I 
nevertheless managed either to talk to their subordinates or leaders of neighbouring 
departments, and I do not think this has influenced the comparability of the Norwegian and 
German sample. The Norwegians were also more concerned about the anonymity guarantee. 
Several of them emphasised either before or during the interview that this was an important 
condition for their participation and their ability to speak openly about the topic. The 
difference in openness between Norwegian and German bureaucracy may be related to my 
identity as a foreigner in Germany and as “just another master student bothering me again” in 
Norway. It could also be due to the fact that the Norwegian bureaucrats have experienced that 
their participation in earlier research has been misused – in their own opinion – and created 
negative attention around them or their institution. I doubt that the Norwegians are more 
pressured with work tasks, as one Norwegian bureaucrat used as excuse to refuse to see me. 
Even though I did not map out how much each interviewee works per week, it was clear that 
the Germans were working a lot, and that they had just managed to squeeze me into their full 
program to be able to talk to me.  
Gender was not a criterion during my selection. It is a coincidence that the Norwegian 
sample consists of five men and five women, whereas I in Germany only had one female 
interviewee. The implication of the gender distribution for the thesis’ results is reflected upon 
in the discussion chapter. 
3.2 In the field 
My fieldwork in Norway and Germany lasted from October 17, 2007 until February 13, 2008. 
The interviews were carried through in Norwegian and German, and transcribed in the 
original language. Some quotes were translated for the empirical chapter.  
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My interviews were semi-structured, and the interview guide was divided in three 
main parts. Semi structured interviews allow the researcher to be flexible and open towards 
other topics the informant might bring up, which the researcher otherwise would have missed 
(Thagaard 1998:81). They also open up for changing the order in which the questions are 
posed and I sometimes left questions out or added new ones when I thought it was necessary. 
The questions were organised around the following topics: perception of climate change and 
policy, strategy on the work place and the role of the individual. The last part of the interview 
guide hence addressed subjects such as personal worry, personal behaviour and individual 
responsibility. These questions could be interesting to analyse in a psychological perspective. 
My intention was nevertheless not to identify what (social-) psychological mechanisms which 
were active in the respondents’ climate narratives. The reasons for including the personal 
dimension represented in the second research question were firstly to investigate how climate 
change has made its way into the private sphere, motivated by the two attitudes discussed in 
section 3.1. Secondly, I hoped that the questions addressing personal behaviour could shed 
additive light on the interviewees’ CC perceptions. 
3.2.1 What kind of knowledge is produced in the interview situation?  
There is disagreement about what it is possible to obtain knowledge about through qualitative 
interviews. Some authors standing in the positivist tradition have argued that “interviews are 
essentially about ascertaining facts or beliefs out there in the world” Silverman 2001:90).  
Advocates of the emotionalist position argue that the main object of interviews is to elicit 
accounts of subjective experience. Because interviews are narratives of what happen or 
happened, the knowledge collected through interviews is a result of the interviewee’s 
understanding of what happened (Thagaard 1998:79). The position of this thesis is 
somewhere between the positivist and the emotionalist, though more biased to the latter. As 
my primary research question aim at investigating perceptions it is clear that the respondents’ 
understandings are of crucial importance to me. On the other hand I ask the respondents about 
actual strategies within their institutions and what their behaviour and consumption patterns 
actually look like. However, it is questionable whether they told the truth – and what they did 
not tell. Every account for actual behaviour is a loaded narrative.  
Knowledge produced in the interview situation is further a result of the relationship 
between the respondents and the researcher. The researchers’ position is important for what 
relation that emerges between the two, and hence for the outcome of the interview situation 
(Thagaard 1998:80). The role of the researcher during the interview and during the analysis 
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period may influence the study’s outcome to a significant degree. Because of qualitative 
research’ principle of mutual influence between researcher and interviewee, the researcher 
should clarify the conditions that characterise the research process (Thagaard 1998:17).  
Widerberg (2001) emphasises the importance of “memory work” (minnearbeid) for 
the researcher in order to identify what knowledge, perceptions and prejudices she has before 
the interviews are carried through. To be able to meet the interviewees with an unbiased 
attitude, I worked on identifying my own relation to and perception of CC. With a background 
from the environmental movement, my starting point was naturally in the favour of the 
environmentalists’ major opinion. I thus tried to inform myself as much as possible about pros 
and cons in the debate, to find out what are the different arguments, uncertainties and 
interests. This work was repeated several times during the process. I also contacted scientists 
at the Department of Geosciences at the University of Oslo and met with two researchers 
there in order to hear their opinion about the current climate debate. My objective in the thesis 
is nevertheless not to account for the different positions within debate on CC, and decide 
which one is the best. It is important to emphasise that I did not try to scrutinise whether the 
respondents were “correctly” informed or believing in the “right thing”. I wanted to study the 
differences in perceptions, and I hence aimed at meeting the respondents with an as unbiased 
attitude as possible. 
The interviews are certainly influenced by the fact that I as a student was meeting 
experts – many of them senior. In Germany, I had the additional disadvantage of not speaking 
my mother tongue. I nevertheless tried to prepare as carefully as possible before each meeting 
by informing myself about the topic of discussion and about their work institution as much as 
I could. I also carried out two pilot interviews, one in Norwegian and one in German 
language.  
 My personal assessment is that I managed to establish a confident setting between me 
and most of the interviewees. The majority of the interviewees opened themselves and spoke 
frankly about the topic. I even got the impression that some of the interviewees felt that they 
could relieve themselves to me and share their opinions around a topic which for some of 
them was seemingly an object for frustration. 
3.3 Limitations 
The scope of the research questions and my limited resources as master student represents 
several challenges. The largest disadvantage what concerns the empirical study is in my 
opinion the size of the sample, both in respect of the number of institutions and the number of 
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respondents from each institution. I only interviewed between 1-3 persons in each institution, 
out of a total of sixteen organisations – eight in Germany and eight in Norway. This has major 
implications for the generalisability of the empirical findings, as I am not able to prove 
whether my results hold for the institutions – and hence for the groups – in general. The fact 
that the interviewees are leaders may serve to support the assumption that their perceptions 
are valid for other parts of the organisation as well. However the research design was not 
developed in order to investigate climate change aspects within a specific organisation 
structure. Taking in an exploratory approach, my aim was to investigate perceptions of CC 
among energy sector employees, rather than to identify institutional cultures. The results 
presented later in the thesis nevertheless imply that organisation culture and institutional 
belonging is of significant importance for the employees’ climate perceptions. This 
assumption is based on the comparison of institutions with similar business activities and 
work tasks. In order to confirm these assumption a more comprehensive study where both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are applied would be necessary. 
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4 Energy and Climate Policy 
Norway and Germany differ largely in their energy politics. I will now explain each country’s 
actual strategies in the energy policies. This is meant to give an overview of the status quo, 
not to be an historical account of the development in bargaining processes. To establish a 
picture of the context for the national policies, I will start out by giving a short presentation of 
key information about Norway and Germany in 4.1, including a brief account of the 
environmental movements and a list of anticipated consequences of climate change for each 
country. Subsequently in 4.2, I illustrate the actual challenges concerning a restructuring of 
energy demand and supply, by contrasting the foreseen future energy demand with the 
amount of GHG reduction according to IPCC.  
4.1 National context overviews 
Germany is a republic in Central Europe. It is a federal democracy, which consists of 16 
Bundesländer (counties) and more than 12 000 Gemeinde (municipalities). Germany was 
among the founders of the European Union and is with its 82 million inhabitants the EU 
country with the largest population. Germany shares boarders with Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
The climate is temperate. The country spreads over 357 104 km
2
 and it has almost 2 400 km 
of coastline along the Baltic and North Sea. The population density is 230/km
2
. 54% of the 
land is cultivated for agriculture purposes and 30% is covered by forest. The national currency 
is Euro (EUR). Its gross domestic product (GDP) counted 2 400 billion EUR in 2007; 40 
USD per capita, and is the third largest national economy in the world, after USA and Japan. 
It is the world’s leading exporting country, and the export surplus was 162 billion EUR in 
2006. The unemployment rate is 9.0%.
9
 The female employment rate is 62%, and 46% of 
these work part time (numbers from 2006).
10
 
Norway is a monarchy in Northern Europe. It is since 1994 member of the European 
Economic Community, but has chosen to stay outside the European Union. Norway boarders 
Sweden, Finland and Russia, and is characterised by a long coastal line that counts more than 
20 000 km. A population of 4.8 million people live in the country which spreads over 323 802 
km
2
. The population density is 14.73/km
2
. Norway is divided in 19 fylker (counties) and 430 
municipalities. Both levels are governed by democratically chosen bodies. The climate is 
                                                 
9
 http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/000100/html/monat/200712.pdf (12.10.08) 
10
 http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/minifakta/no/main_05.html (12.10.08) 
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temperate, above all due to the Gulf Stream, but the northern areas are dominated by more 
arctic conditions. The national currency is Norwegian kroner (NOK).
11
 The Norwegian GDP 
counted 2 277 billion NOK in 2007; 83 USD per capita. Luxembourg is the only European 
country which exceeds the Norwegian GDP level when disparities between national price 
levels are corrected for.
12
 In 2007, the export surplus was 365 billion NOK, 16% of total 
GDP. The unemployment rate is 2.8%.
13
 Seven out of ten women are employed, of which 
43% work part time (numbers from 2006).   
4.1.1 Environmental movements 
The German environmental movement as it is known today grew in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Roose identifies this as a result of two parallel factors. Firstly, the publishing of several books 
that addressed the problem of increasing pollution and resource use, above all “Limits to 
growth” (Meadows et al 1972) and “Silent spring” (Carsons 1962), and secondly, the 
construction of nuclear power stations in Germany. The latter was met with substantial 
resistance, and the environmental movement managed to delay and stop the construction of 
two planned for power stations. In no other European country is and was the environmental 
movement to such a degree dominated by the issue of nuclear energy as in Germany (Roose 
2006:273). By the end of the 1990s, there were at least 9200 environmental organisations in 
Germany. The organisations are supported by ecological oriented research institutes. The 
Öko-Institut was the institute first established and it evolved in the wake of the nuclear power 
conflicts referred to above. During the last decades the support to the environmental 
organisations has increased. Between 1985 and 2003, the member numbers for the four largest 
organisations has tripled. In 2003, Greenpeace had about 550 000 members, BUND
14
 and 
NABU
15
 almost 400 000 members each and WWF 250 000 members (Roose 2006:274).   
The emergence of the Norwegian environmental movement coincided largely with the 
development in Germany. In the late 1960s and early 1970s several environmental 
organisations were established. Environmentalism became a permanent political issue in 
Norwegian politics at the end of the 1970s (Grenstad et al 2006:32). Despite the prominent 
position of organisations in the Norwegian society, Grenstad et al argue that environmental 
organisations have failed to become broad popular movements and membership rates have 
                                                 
11
 The exchange rate as of 13.11.2008 was 1 EUR = 8.9 NOK 
12
 http://www.ssb.no/regnskap/ (12.10.08) 
13
 http://www.ssb.no/arbeid/main.shtml (12.10.08) 
14
 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland  
15
 Naturschutzbund Deutschland 
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never been high. This is extraordinary in a country with an extensive voluntary sector 
(Sivesind et al 2002). Grenstad et al identify two reasons for this. One is that Norwegian 
Governmental bodies adapt environmental concerns early, making mobilisation more difficult 
and less necessary. Another explanation is connected to the current transformation of the 
voluntary sector and the fact that it in general has become much more difficult for politically 
based organisations to achieve high membership numbers (Grenstad et al 2006:33). The 
largest organisations are The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature which 
counted almost 18 000 members, Future in Our Hands with more than 20 000 members and 
Nature and Youth (NU) – an environmental youth organisation (25 years age limit) – which 
counted around 6000 members in 2008.  
4.1.2 Regional Climate Change  
It is impossible to give an account of all impacts of climate change for Norway or Germany. 
Climate change is a global phenomenon, and climate change in other parts of the world will 
most likely have consequences for the situation in Europe as well through economic, political 
and social impacts. The last decades of intensifying globalization has also made us more 
vulnerable to such changes in other parts of the world. I will give a brief review of the 
possible consequences of climate change for the two countries in my thesis, based on the 4
th
 
assessment reports from the IPCC, working group II (IPCC 2007b). This was also one of the 
first questions in my interview guide, and aimed both at investigating what they had heard 
about the consequences of climate change for their own country, as at examining to what 
extend they considered the global threats as a threat for themselves and their country.  
For Norway the anticipated consequences are the following: 
- “More” weather: increased precipitation – which can lead to increased floodings, more 
wind, more and stronger storms  
- Glaciers withdrawing or disappearing 
- Sea level rise 
- Increased productivity in the agricultural sector and forestry (longer growth period) 
- new instabilities in geological conditions  – more frequently avalanches, possibility of 
damage affecting infrastructure (including roads, power grids and pipelines) 
- Changed conditions for flora and fauna – new species occur, traditional species may 
become extinct (Mathismoen 2007).  
In Germany, the following changes are expected: 
- Sea level rise 
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- Extreme weather occurs more often – with heat waves, storms, heavy precipitation, 
erosion, dryer areas as possible consequences. 
- Glaciers melting down: lower water level in the floods, regional limitations on 
drinking water, permafrost disappear, increased avalanche risk. This may have impacts 
on infrastructure as transport network and electricity deliverance. 
- Flooding along the river banks: increased erosion. 
- Extended vegetation periods. 
- Species emigrate or extinct, other species occur. 
- Damaging species will make forestry and agriculture more difficult (Germanwatch 
2007). 
 
4.2 Global energy demand and recommended emission reduction 
Figure 1: World energy consumption 1980 - 2030. Btu. (EIA 2008)
 
 
 
 
Energy policy is a highly controversial issue. There is major disagreement about for example 
the potential for development of RES, the potential for energy saving and efficiency, the 
necessity of nuclear energy and so on. A look at the prognoses for energy demand in the 21
st
 
century illustrates the scope of the challenges connected to increased energy production. Both 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
have predicted that the energy consumption and production will increase dramatically in the 
21
st
 century. 
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Figure 2: World energy demand 1970-2030, by energy source. Mtoe. (IEA 2006) 
 
The reference scenario
16
 presented in IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2006 foresees that fossil 
energy sources will cover the major part of rise in energy demand. The renewable energy 
sources will also increase, but will still only make out a marginal part of world wide energy 
consumption. 
Figure 3: OPEC oil production, 1990 – 2030. Million barrels per day. (EIA 2006) 
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 Assumes policies as of 2006, 1 % per year population growth, 3,4 % growth in GDP etc (2006:53). 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/weo2006.pdf (10.10.08) 
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In spite of different predictions of peak oil, which claim that the maximum oil production has 
already been reached, the EIA predicts that the world wide oil production will continue to 
increase, to approximately fifty million barrels per day in 2030, almost twice as much as in 
1990, the reference year of emission reduction aims in the Kyoto Protocol.  
The foreseen increase in energy demand represents a huge dilemma contrasted to the 
climate scientists’ recommendations for emission reductions. The IPCC have stated that a 
global warming that exceeds an augmentation of two degrees above pre-industrial level will 
be “very dangerous”. This is the reason why several political institutions, including the EU 
and the Norwegian Government, operate with a “two degree” objective, according to which 
one must undertake emissions reductions sufficient to avoid a higher temperature rise than 
two degrees above pre-industrial level. The third working group of the IPCC states that 
stabilizing the temperature between 2 – 2.4 degrees above pre-industrial level demands that 
the amount of CO2-equivalents in the atmosphere stabilizes at a level between 445 and 490 
ppm. In 2007, the level was slightly above 380 ppm. The peaking year of the emissions must 
occur between 2000-2015, and within 2050, the global CO2 emissions must be cut with 50 – 
85% of the year 2000 level. The IPCC has further suggested that after the peak in emissions, a 
reduction in greenhouse gases in the range of 25-40% by 2020 is necessary (IPCC 2007c). 
The emission profiles of these scenarios indicate the need for short-term infrastructure 
investments for a comparatively early decarbonisation of the energy system. Achieving these 
low-emission trajectories requires a comprehensive global mitigation effort, including a 
further tightening of existing climate policies in Annex I countries, and simultaneous emission 
mitigation in developing countries, where most of the increase in emissions is expected in the 
coming decades (IPCC 2007b).  
4.3 Norway 
Norway’s energy system is largely characterised by the country’s outstanding natural 
resources, with major implications for both energy and climate policy. Excess of electricity 
and petroleum products has led to low prices and little tradition for energy savings and 
efficiency. I will now account for the most important aspects of the energy and climate 
situation in Norway. 
4.3.1 Energy situation 
Norway is a net exporter of energy. In 2006, Norway had a total energy production of 2 715 
TWh. Of this, as much as 2 389 TWh was exported. The main energy sources for export was 
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crude oil (1 175 TWh) and natural gas (936 TWh). Norway is one of the largest crude oil 
exporters in the world.
17
 The petroleum sector’s gross product accounted for 22.5% of 
Norway’s GDP in 2005.  
The total consumption of energy in 2006 was 222 TWh, 14.4% more than in 1990. Of 
this, 80 TWh went to industry and mining, 60 TWh was used for transport means, and 83 
TWh went to other sectors whereof private households 44 TWh, and fishery and agricultural 
sectors 9 TWh.
18
  
 
Figure 4: Norway’s net energy consumption in 2005, by source. (Statistics Norway19) 
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Electricity makes up an unusually high proportion of Norway’s total energy consumption, 
compared to almost any other country in the world. As showed in figure 4, electricity covers 
51% of Norway’s total consumption and is by far the largest energy source. Petroleum 
products were the second largest energy source with 35%. The electricity consumption is 
approximately ten times higher than the world mid value. This is due to a large amount of 
energy intensive industry and the fact that electricity is used for heating purposes to a larger 
extend than in other countries. Because of favourable geographical conditions, Norway’s 
electricity production is to 99% hydro generated, which historically has led to an excess of 
cheap electricity. The price of electricity in Norway is still low compared to other European 
                                                 
17
 http://www.ssb.no/energiregn/tab-2007-10-19-03.html (12.07.08) 
18
 http://www.ssb.no/energiregn/ (12.07.08) 
19
 http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/03/10/energi/fig01-energi2005.gif (12.07.08) 
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countries. In 2007, the price was approximately 80øre/kWh.
20
  This is almost half the price in 
Germany. The electricity production varies from each year with the amount of precipitation. 
Since 2000, annual production has been between 143 and 107 TWh/yr.  
The petroleum sector is Norway’s largest industry with immense consequences for the 
entire Norwegian society. In 2007, the sector accounted for 24% of the country’s GDP. 
Norway was the world’s fifth largest oil producer with 2.31 million barrels oil per day in 
2007, and the world’s third largest gas producer in 2006 with 85.2 billion m3 gas per year. 
Crude oil, natural gas and pipeline services accounted for 48% – 509 billion NOK – of the 
value of Norway’s exports in 2007. Through 40 years of operation, the petroleum industry has 
created values for more than 6000 billion NOK (800 billion EUR). The state has in the same 
period intervened with huge investments in search, development, infrastructure and 
constructions. At the end of 2007, these values accounted for more than 2100 billion NOK 
(250 billion EUR) in 2008 value.
21
 
4.3.2 Climate policy 
Norway’s total GHG emissions in 2007 were approximately 55 million tonnes CO2-
equivalents (CO2e). Figure 5 shows the main contributors to Norwegian emissions from 1990 
to 2007. Because of Norway’s exceptional energy production, the major emission sources are 
industry (15.6 million tonnes), petroleum (13.3 million tonnes) and transport – both air and 
land (12.8 million tonnes) (St.meld. nr. 34 2006-2007:24).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Corresponds to 10 cEUR  
21
 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec.html?id=1009 
(20.10.08) 
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Figure 5: Norwegian GHG emissions 1990 – 2007. Mill tonne CO2e (Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate (NVE) 2008
22
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The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) has conducted a study which estimates  
that if no new policy measures are implemented, the emissions in 2020 will increase with 9 
million tonne CO2e from 1990-level (49.7 million tonnes). If on the contrary all technical 
mitigation options are carried through, Norway has an emission reduction potential of 19.9 
million tonne – a reduction of 22% compared to 1990-level, spread over 57 different 
mitigation options within all sectors. The costs of the measures range from below 200 NOK to 
over 600 NOK/tonne (Langtvedt et al 2007). The measure options involve Carbon Capturing 
and Storage (CCS), bio fuels, introduction of renewable energy, energy savings, 
electrification of the petroleum shelf
23
, collection of methane gas in the agricultural sector, 
new waste disposal systems and technological innovation within the shipping industry 
(Langtvedt et al 2007:3-8). 
 
 
                                                 
22
 http://www.nve.no/modules/module_109/publisher_view_product.asp?iEntityId=10252 (20.10.08) 
23
 Means to supply the off-shore petroleum production with land produced electricity. 
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Figure 6: Norwegian GHG emissions by sector 1990 – 2020. Mill tonne CO2e. (Langtvedt et al 2007:14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Norwegian Government has stated the following overall aims for the national climate 
policy: 
1. Cutting global emissions equivalent to 30% of Norway’s emissions in 1990 by 2020.   
2. “Carbon neutrality” in 2030  
The emission reduction obligation should be realised with a combination of national measures 
and the use of the mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol.
24
 In January 2008, the Norwegian 
Government announced the ambition to undertake two-thirds of the total emission reductions 
nationally. They nevertheless added that it is not possible to set up specific reduction aims for 
different sectors because of large uncertainty (St.meld. nr. 34 2006-2007:36-37, Regjeringen 
2008).  
The main principles in Norway’s climate policy are 1) governance efficiency 2) cost 
efficiency 3) polluter pays principle and 4) sustainable development (precautionary principle). 
Economic and regulatory measures are the most important instruments to attain the climate 
policy aims. Approximately 70% of the national emissions are now either part of the emission 
trading scheme or covered by a CO2-tax. Some emission sources cannot be covered by any of 
these two, and other measures have to be undertaken to reduce these emissions. (St.meld. nr. 
34 2006-2007:46) 
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 The main mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol (also called the flexible mechanisms) are the emission trading 
scheme (ETS), joint implementation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM). 
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The emission trading scheme was established in Norway in 2005, and has been one of 
the most important measures for attaining the country’s Kyoto target. In 2007 it covered more 
than 40% of the national emissions (St.meld. nr. 34 2006-2007:47). In the period 2008-2012, 
Norway will join the European Union’s market for emission trading, and the quota obligation 
for this period will be more than three times as comprehensive as the previous. For emissions 
not included in the emission trading scheme, the CO2-tax is the main measure. It covers 
approximately 52% of the Norwegian CO2 emissions. The price varies for different materials. 
The CO2-tax for fuel (petrol) is 345 NOK/tonne CO2, natural gas 200 NOK/tonne CO2 and the 
prices off-shore varies between 255 and 342 NOK/tonne CO2.    
After COP13
25
 at Bali in December 2007, the Norwegian Ministry of Environment stated that 
the areas with main priority in Norwegian climate policy would be:  
1) Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Developing CCS as a new technology. 
2) Rainforest. As a rich country, Norway will spend 3 billion NOK per year for the 
maintaining of rainforest. In January 2008, the public administration will work to 
establish a system for this.   
3) Shipping. As a major shipping nation, Norway has the possibility to develop 
sustainable solutions for the shipping industry (Regjeringen 2008).  
Norwegian authorities express the ambition to work for the establishment of an ambitious 
climate agreement which includes as many countries as possible. The aspiration of urging a 
cost effective international climate policy is the objective behind Norway’s ambitious aims 
for emission reduction (St. meld 34:38, NOU 2006:18:30).    
Klimaforliket (The climate compromise) is an agreement between six political parties
26
 
about principles, aims and measures in Norwegian climate policy. It states that public 
spending on climate related research will be increased. This includes development of 
renewable energy and climate friendly technology. The Research Council of Norway, which 
distributes public research funding, spent 85.6 million NOK on research within renewable 
energy in 2007. At the same time, research on petroleum activity – including the funding of 
research on CCS – received 496.5 million NOK.27 In the national budget for 2009, financial 
research means will increase by 300 million NOK for renewable energy, energy efficiency 
and CCS. By 2010, the total amount shall be minimum 600 million NOK and at least at the 
same level as the support level for petroleum research (Regjeringen 2008). 
                                                 
25
 The 13
th
 United Nation climate negotiation, conference of the parties (COP) 
26
 Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Venstre, Kristelig Folkeparti, Høyre and Senterpartiet. 
27
 http://www.klassekampen.no/49135/mod_article/item/null (16.01.08) 
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4.4 Germany 
In this section I account for Germany’s energy situation, which is characterised by limited 
domestic energy sources. I also account for Germany’s climate policy, which is among the 
most ambitious in Europe. 
4.4.1 Energy situation 
In contrast to Norway, Germany is a net energy importer. Its dependency on energy imports is 
increasing, and accounted for 75% of total energy consumption in 2006. Germany is self 
supplied in the renewable energies and lignite based energy production. For the other sources 
the import dependency is respectively 97% for oil, 83% for natural gas and 61% for hard coal. 
Nuclear power production relies to 100 % on uranium imports, but is in some statistics 
counted as a domestic energy source. When this is done, the import of primary energy in 
Germany accounts for 62% (BMU & BMWi 2006). The most important import country for oil 
and gas is Russia with more than 40% of gas imports, followed by Norway. Russia and 
Norway together account for more than 2/3 of Germany’s gas imports and 50% of its oil 
imports (BMWi 2008).  
In 2006, Germany’s primary energy consumption was 4055 TWh. Thereof, 1084 TWh 
were produced nationally and 3568 TWh were imported. Final energy consumption was 2618 
TWh. This was divided almost equally between the sectors industry (741 TWh), transport 
(733 TWh), households (745 TWh) and trades and services (398 TWh).  
 
Figure 7: Primary energy consumption in Germany 2007 (BMWi 2007).
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As shown in figure 7, primary energy consumption is dominated by crude oil (33%), of which 
the major part is used for transport. This is followed by coal (26%) and natural gas (23%), 
used for electricity generation and directly for cooking and heating purposes in the 
households. Compared to other IEA countries, Germany’s share of RES (7%) in its primary 
energy consumption is very high. RES has grown tremendously in recent years from 1.8% of 
primary energy supply in 1995 to 4.6% in 2006, equivalent to an average annual growth rate 
of 10.1% (IEA 2007).   
 
Figure 8: Primary energy supply to Germany’s electricity production 1975 – 2030. (IEA 2007) 
 
 
 
The total electricity production in 2007 was 636 TWh. To attain this amount, the input of 
1491 TWh from combustibles was required, equivalent to 39% of the total primary energy 
consumption. The composition of primary energy sources needed for electricity production 
consisted of 29% nuclear energy, 28% lignite, 25% hard coal, 10% gas and 8% other sources. 
As shown in figure 8, the source with the largest growth has been natural gas and RES (IEA 
2007). Renewable energy sources accounted in 2007 for 87 TWh (14%) of gross electricity 
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production, spread on the following sources: 21 TWh hydropower, 40 TWh wind, 25 TWh 
bio mass and about 4 TWh photovoltaics (PV) (BMWi 2008).
29
  
The energy consumption in Germany has been declining since 1990, and economic 
growth is hence decoupling from it, as shown in figure 9. This is to a large degree a 
consequence of a comprehensive change in the energy production in the former GDR, where 
power was generated at low efficiency. The political ambition is now a doubling of the energy 
productivity by 2020, compared to 1990.  
 
Figure 9: Primary energy consumption, GDP and energy productivity in Germany 1990 – 2006. (German 
Federal Statistical Office 2008) 
 
 
The Federal state’s expenditures for research on energy in Germany was 417 million EUR in 
2007 and accounted for almost 5% of the state’s total research expenditures. Of this, 205 
million EUR was used for RES and energy saving research. Almost 200 million went to 
nuclear research purposes and 12 million EUR were addressed coal and other energy 
sources.
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4.4.2 Climate policy 
As EU member and founder country, Germany has to follow the instructions of the EU. At the 
same time, they also have an influence on the EU’s climate policy. EU has adopted the 
IPCC’s recommendations as their overall aim for the climate policy: to stabilise the 
temperature-rise at two degrees above pre-industrial level.   
In 2004, the German GHG emissions were 1025 million tonnes CO2e. This is a 
reduction with 17% compared to 1990. The majority of this reduction took place the first ten 
years after 1990, and is mainly a result of the substantial structural changes, above all the 
reorganisation of industry after the German unification. By 1990, the East German GDP was 
about 40% of the West German, but the per capita energy consumption was 120% of the West 
German consumption. For electricity, the per capita consumption was the same in both 
countries, but the per capita CO2 emissions in East Germany were twice as high and the SO2-
emissions ten times as high as the West German per capita level. There was, in other words, a 
huge GHG emission reduction potential in the so-called Neue Bundesländer (Fröhler 
2001:11). Since 2000 the German emissions have remained at a relatively stable level 
(McKinsey 2007:23). 
 
Figure 10: Annual CO2 emissions in Germany 1990 – 2004 (UBA 2006).
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The German Government has expressed the ambition to reduce their climate gas 
emissions with 40% compared to 1990-level by 2020, on the condition that other countries 
also oblige themselves to remarkable emission reductions. In August 2007, the German 
Government published an integrated paper on energy and climate policy, the so-called 
Meseberg paper, with a list of measures to be undertaken by 2020. Calculations have shown 
that these measures will cause a reduction in GHG emissions of 36-37% by 2020 
(Bundesregierung 2007). 
In September 2007, the McKinsey-study made for the Federation of German Industries 
(BDI), was published. It estimated the potential and costs of reducing greenhouse gases in 
Germany by 2020 and 2030. The results are presented in figure 11. According to its 
calculations, many of the measures would actually generate a positive payoff. A total of 127 
Mt CO2e could be reduced through levers with abatement costs that would pay back within 
the amortisation period (McKinsey 2007:15). This corresponds to a reduction in GHG 
emissions of 25% compared to 1990-level by 2020. Utterly 14 Mt CO2e could be abated at a 
cost less than 20 EUR/tonne CO2e. A reduction with 31% is possible when measures with 
distinctly higher costs, between 32 and 175 EUR/tonne CO2e, are included (McKinsey 
2007:14). 
Figure 11: Potential and costs of reducing GHG emissions in Germany by 2020. (McKinsey 2007) 
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The Meseberg paper was based on calculations from the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and 
Innovation Research, which showed that Germany can profit 5 billions EUR in 2020 if the 
specific measures listed in table 2 are realised.  
Table 2: Reduction potential by 2020 of several measures. Mt CO2e. (Bundesregierung 2007)  
Measure Reduction potential by 2020 
million tonne CO2-equivalents 
Renewal of fossil power plants 15.0 
Renewable energy production 54.4 
Combined heat and power generation 13.3 
Renovation of housing and heating constructions 31.0 
Renewable heating 9.2 
Electricity saving 25.5 
Transport measures – bio fuels, incorporation of air 
transport in ET, measures for shipping etc 33.6 
Measures for other GHG (methane, N2O, F-gases) 36.4 
Sum 219.4 
 
The climate policy is expected not only to reduce climate gases. The German authorities have 
high expectations to the positive effects of the climate policy for the economy and entire 
German society. First of all, the climate/renewable strategy is expected to create jobs in the 
new branches that deal with renewable energy and energy saving. In 2007, almost 150 000 
people worked within this sector, and the BMU estimates that the sector can provide 500.000 
extra jobs within 2020. The Government estimates the annual costs of the planned climate 
protection program to be approximately 3 billion EUR until 2010. It argues that the costs of 
not acting against climate change, i.e. the costs of the damages, will be much higher than the 
costs of an ambitioned climate policy. An additional positive side effect of the climate policy 
is the saving of 20 billion EUR per year for energy imports within 2020, and almost 35 billion 
EUR per year within 2030. The program will also boost net investments with more than 30 
billion EUR per year and hence create more economic growth.
32
  
An important aspect of the German climate strategy is their role as a pioneer in the 
international development, with regard to reducing GHG emissions nationally and also in 
their effort in the international negotiations towards a new binding agreement that will follow 
the Kyoto protocol after 2012.
33
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
Norwegian and German energy and climate policies differ largely, first of all because of 
substantial differences in the design of their energy systems. German energy consumption is 
about 18 times higher than the Norwegian. Norway’s electricity supply is completely covered 
by hydropower, and contributes in this respect insignificantly to Norwegian GHG emissions. 
In Germany, electricity production is the main source for the country’s GHG emissions (43% 
in 2002), and most of the abatement measures are therefore directed at reorganising the 
energy sector, including insulating houses, improving coal-based power plants (or change to 
natural gas) and increased use of combined heat and power plants (see table 2). Norway has a 
huge potential for RES because of favourable natural conditions, whereas Germany with a 
large and densely situated population have larger possibilities within the sphere of energy 
saving and efficiency. According to Fornybar energi 2007, the Norwegian wind power 
resources are notably larger than Germany’s, and the potential for bio mass is estimated to 
140 TWh (Fornybar energi 2007). Germany’s long-term potential for wind power and bio 
mass is in one study estimated to 262 TWh and 87 TWh respectively (Schreyer & Mez 2008). 
Despite this fact, the German policy for development of RES is far more ambitious than the 
Norwegian. So is the German target for national emission abatement, which aims at 40% 
reduction by 2020 compared with 2/3 of 30% in Norway. This may be related to the fact to 
cut emissions in Norway would probably implicate interventions in the petroleum sector, 
which is very important for the Norwegian economy. Development of RES would not lead to 
significant emission reductions in Norway, unless saved energy could replace other polluting 
sources, such as fuels for transport mean, gas-based power station on the petroleum shelf or 
be exported to central Europe. This is very different in Germany, where increased energy 
efficiency and renewable energy production is hoped to combine emission abatement with 
lower energy costs and reduced import dependency.  
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5 State and industry inter-linkages in the energy sector 
Both the German and the Norwegian energy sector are subject to extensive policy regulation 
by public authorities, which is the case for most industrialized countries. Intervention from the 
state is particularly conspicuous in the electricity sector, as this sector is characterised by 
natural monopolies and thus a need for central coordination. Energy use often impacts the 
environment, and thus the attention of the authorities is necessary. Extraction of lignite and 
hard coal, development of hydropower and power grids, influences the natural environment, 
whilst heat power production and combustion of fossil fuels involves emission to air. The 
standard economics view is that state intervention in the energy sector prevents market 
failure. This is important for a country’s economy, as energy plays a key role for the entire 
production system as a central part of production costs (NOU 1998:11, Dahlmann 1990:232).  
5.1 The case of Norway 
The Norwegian state has played an outstanding role in the development of its energy sector. 
As the energy sector is largely dominated by hydropower, this is true for the electricity sector 
in particular. Compared with the other Nordic countries, the Norwegian electricity sector has 
doubtless been the one most dominated by politics (Thue 1995:25). The Norwegian Water 
Resource and Energy Directorate has played a central role in this development since its 
forerunner, Kanalvesenet, started to buy property rights to waterfalls on behalf of the state in 
1894.
34
 In 1921, the Norwegian Water Resource and Electricity Department (NVE) was 
established. It was at the same time a developer of hydropower, a power producer and 
responsible for granting concessions for developers of hydropower. Considerable state 
intervention was also the case as Norway started to produce petroleum in the 1970s. In the 
next sections I will account more detailed for these developments within the Norwegian 
electricity and petroleum sector.  
5.1.1 Exceptional hydropower resources 
The development of Norwegian hydropower resources was a result of the organisation of two 
main interests: to secure domestic control over national resources and the need for foreign 
capital and competence for the construction of power stations. Based on the Act of Hjemfall 
(see below), alliances with foreign investors was made possible (Sejersted 1999:16). This use 
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of foreign investment and know-how was later to be repeated in the development of the 
petroleum sector. 
The political choice to combine national control with foreign investment was possible 
because of political, demographical, social and historical reasons. The main traits of the 
organisation of the electricity sector originated in the early formative periods of the sector 
from the end of the 19
th
 century up to 1930, and remained up to the early 1990s. Key factors 
in the development of the energy sector were the hydropower resources, a strong tradition for 
municipal and regional autonomy and a nationalistic orientation (Magnus & Midttun 2000). 
Because of Norway’s early democratisation – 40% of all Norwegian men, including peasants, 
were given the right to vote in 1814 – Norwegian peasants used municipal institutions as an 
organisational device both for political mobilisation and developing local infrastructures. 
Local Governments also benefited from considerable economic autonomy (Thue 1995:19). 
During the first years private utilities were dominant in the cities, but within a few decades 
municipal ownership won out (Thue 1995:16). As early as in 1887, the Government opened 
up sites for dams and regulation of watercourses for expropriation, and in 1894 a law was 
passed that made it easy to have sites expropriated for building transmission lines. These 
progressive reforms – that sometimes offended rural interests – can be explained with the 
close alliance between a strong administrative elite in the state apparatus and the merchants 
and industrialists in the cities during the 19
th
 century (Thue 1995:16). To a certain extent, 
municipalities functioned as cooperative organisations for the users of electricity. 
Municipalities’ fixing of prices was to offer electricity as cheaply as possible. The utilities 
should balance their incomes and expenditures, not make profit. As a result, the electricity 
sector became more network-like than market dominated. At least indirectly the consumers 
decided the price of electricity, often after intense political discussions in the community 
(Thue 1995:17). 
In the period 1905 to 1930, decisions were made that influence the electricity sector 
even today. The wide natural dispersion of hydro-resources made it possible for a number of 
municipalities and inter-municipal consortia to engage in local development of hydropower 
projects. From the end of the 19
th
 century, foreign capital was invested heavily in hydropower 
production and in the electrochemical and electrometallurgical industries. Norwegians 
themselves lacked capital for large investments like hydropower and large industry 
development. In 1906, foreigners owned more than 3/4 of the developed waterfalls (NOU 
2004:26).  In reaction to the expansion of mostly foreign-owned big industry, the Norwegian 
social liberal Government strictly regulated the private exploitation of the hydropower 
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resources. The most central measure in this policy was the Act of hjemfall  that was passed in 
1906. Hjemfall introduced concession obligation for expropriation of watercourses and 
development of larger waterfalls. According to the concession Act of 1909, private actors can 
obtain concession for a limited period of time (normally 60 years). When the period ends, the 
hydropower resources and power plant constructions goes to the state without compensation, 
i.e. the resources falls home (= hjemfall). The Act ensured that private and foreign capital 
could develop the hydropower resources whereas the authorities could control the exploitation 
of the resources and access to the ownership in a long term perspective. Hjemfall also secured 
income to state and municipalities, as the private actor was obliged to give away up to 1/3 of 
the profit. It hence clearly favours the municipalities and counties as suppliers of electricity 
for general purposes (Thue 1995:22). The background for the Act of hjemfall was the 
possibility to manage the hydropower resources for the best of the commons (NOU 2004:26).  
From the late 1920s the state became involved in hydropower production through 
NVE, initially mostly to supplement the efforts of local authorities. In 1938, the Norwegian 
Parliament granted support for the installation of electricity to the remaining 25% of the 
population that were still lacking it, and NVE carried out the task by the mid 1960s. After the 
Second World War, NVE also became an important supplier of cheap electricity for energy-
intensive industry (Thue 1995:22-23). In the following years, the state took responsibility for 
serving power-intensive industry with large quantities of cheap power and strengthened the 
regulation of the power sector. From the late 1960s environmental questions contributed to 
this development (Thue 1995:27).  
In 1986, NVE went through a major reorganisation and its previous responsibility for 
power production and the power grid was handed over to Statkraft, a fully state-owned 
company. Statkraft has bought holdings previously owned by municipalities or counties 
because of politically addressed support from the Norwegian parliament and owns today 
about 45% of the Norwegian production capacity (NOU 2004:26). Statnett was established 
1990 and took over the responsibility for the power grid. In 1990 the Norwegian Parliament 
approved a new Energy Act which entered into force January 1991. It introduced competition 
in production and trade with electricity, while at the same time central Governmental control 
over transmission and distribution activities was strengthened. The Norwegian reform aimed 
primarily at introducing competition rather than privatisation, and the Norwegian electricity 
industry has for the main part remained in public hands (Magnus & Midttun 2000:1, NOU 
2004:26). By 2004 88% of the power production and almost 100% of the power grid was the 
property of public companies. In 2007, the state took out 6.7 billion NOK in profit from 
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Statkraft and Statnett. The municipalities and counties, which hold around 42 % of the 
Norwegian capacity, took out 3.2 billions and 736 million NOK respectively from their 
energy companies (Statens eierberetning 2007). 
5.1.2 The petroleum sector 
The history of Norwegian oil and gas development began in the 1960s, when American 
Phillips launched its interest in activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In 1969, the 
first large finding of oil in the North Sea was made. Foreign companies were investing large 
sums in the exploration of Norwegian, British and Danish sea ground, and in the following 
years several large findings was made. The Norwegian Authorities nevertheless wanted to 
integrate the petroleum activity in the Norwegian society. In 1971, ten “oil commandments” 
was passed by the Norwegian Parliament, which described the basic principles of the future 
oil policy. The commandments states that all activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
should be under national governance and control. As a consequence, the fully state-owned oil 
company Statoil and the Norwegian Petroleum Institute was founded in 1972. Statoil was the 
most important instrument for the national control over the petroleum resources. Throughout 
the 1970s, Statoil enjoyed a lot of privileges before all other actors in the sector when 
concessions and profit shares were distributed. The authorities also passed a rule that 
proscribed 50% state participation in every petroleum extraction concession. The intention 
was that the Norwegian society should take part in the oil activity on all levels.  In 1985 the 
state’s involvement in the petroleum sector was divided into the company Statoil and The 
State’s direct financial interest (SDFI). The latter implies that the Norwegian State 
participates in the Norwegian petroleum sector directly as an investor in oil and gas fields, 
pipelines and constructions on shore (Sejersted 1999:21, 25, 30).
35
  
Johan P. Olsen introduces the term “petrolisation” to describe the development within 
the Norwegian petroleum sector. Petrolisation opposes politisation, and implies that parts of 
the petroleum activity are withdrawn from political governance because the processes are not 
in touch with the traditional political institutions. Olsen argues that the Norwegian petroleum 
sector has been subject to such a development, despite that the public control over the sector 
was established by law. The explanation for this is that the industrial technological 
development was put outside policy processes already in an early stage. The petrolisation was 
therefore a political decision (Sejersted 1999:11). Correspondingly to Olsen’s thesis, Hauge 
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finds that the process for issuing concessions for petroleum development to a large degree is a 
de-politised process because it is governed by the political bureaucracy and not by the 
political instances Government and Parliament (Hauge 2007:112).   
The shape of the inter-linkages between state and industry within the petroleum sector 
has changed substantially since the establishment of Statoil. In the 1990s, a process started to 
turn Statoil into a commercially active oil company, which could compete side by side with 
other international energy companies on the international market. The Norwegian Parliament 
decided to convert Statoil into a stockholding company in 2001, and opened 1/3 of the stocks 
for sale to private investors. In 2007, Statoil merged with Norsk Hydro into StatoilHydro. The 
Norwegian state holds almost 63% of the stocks in the company, a share that will increase to 
67% over time. Today, StatoilHydro operates as any other actor on the Norwegian shelf. The 
company’s board is responsible for the commercial development of the company. The 
function of continued state ownership is to secure national competence and employment.
36
  
Since the 1990s, the mutual influence of state and industry to an increasing degree 
takes place in common fora and foundations created to strengthen the alliances between 
involved actors.  One important institution is INTSOK - Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners, a 
foundation established in 1997 by the Norwegian oil and gas industry and the Norwegian 
Government.  INTSOKs objective is to strengthen the long-term basis for value creation and 
employment in Norwegian petroleum industry through international activity.
37
 As a 
consequence, Statoil has been internationalised with large intensity, backed up by a highly 
active state. The company that was established as a national political instrument to confront 
multi-national companies has therefore turned into one itself. According to Sejersted, a clear 
division between public and private sector has been replaced by a large grey zone with 
alliances as well as concurrence between public and private interests, which has contributed to 
an increased de-politisation of the petroleum sector (Sejersted 1999:71, 98-99).  
KonKraft Topplederforum is another institution where all actors that either work in or 
for the petroleum sector have gathered. According to Ytreberg (2008) this forum worked 
intensely from 2000 to 2006 to open the northern areas for petroleum extraction.
38
 In 2001, 
the newly-elected Government declared to stop the search for petroleum until there had been a 
neutral report about the area’s vulnerability in environmental regards. After a long struggle 
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between the oil industry and the environmental movements, the Norwegian Parliament in 
2006 voted for petroleum extraction in the Barent Sea (Barentshavet). According to Ytreberg, 
this was a result of Konkraft’s offensive strategy to turn the political opinion. From 2002 to 
2006, the petroleum industry spent more than 100 million NOK (12 million EUR) on an 
environmental program, addressed to strengthen the environmental profile of the industry, to 
influence the opinion and secure admission to new areas of exploration. 
Ytreberg describes the actors in the petroleum sector as so closely interwoven that they 
appear as a cluster. In the minutes from Topplederforum’s meetings, the actors also refer to 
themselves as “the oil cluster”. Ytreberg’s journalism revealed that The Ministry for Oil and 
Energy, which is supposed to be neutral and governed by elected members of Parliament, was 
one of the oil industry’s most important allies in the struggle with the environmental 
movements about petroleum extraction in northern areas.  
Reitan has studied the development of Norwegian environmental policy and describes 
the involved actors and institutions (See chapter 2.2). According to Reitan, there has been 
continually stable interaction between industry interests both on the inside and on the outside 
of the political bureaucracy. Her findings reveal that the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry 
of Economy both advocated the industry’s interests in environmental decision processes. In 
Reitan’s case studies – pollution policy in the 1970s and 1980s and climate policy in the 
1990s – the industry presented suggestions and interests which the Ministries absorbed and 
promoted to other parts of the political system (Reitan 1998:202-203). Reitan identifies strong 
cooperation and common interests between the industry organizations for both cases. A 
possible explanation outlined by Reitan is that the industry is a more clearly defined sector 
than the environmental field.  
5.1.3 Development of new renewable energy 
The Government has three main groups of measures for development of renewable energy: 1) 
measures carried out by Enova, 2) economic and regulatory measures and 3) research and 
development (Størvold 2008).  
Enova was established 2002 and is a state owned company responsible for an 
environmentally friendly restructuring of energy use and production in Norway, including 
energy efficiency and public development support for new renewable energy in Norway.
39
 
Norway has a joined ambition to achieve 15 TWh from energy saving and development of 
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new renewable energy within 2010. Renewable energy development is first of all promoted 
through direct subsidies on produced energy (hydropower 4 øre/kWh, wind power 8 øre/kWh 
and bio energy and other non-mature technologies
40
 10 øre/kWh). Enova is financed through 
the state budget and a fee on electricity (St.meld. nr. 34 (2006-2007):114).    
5.2 The case of Germany 
Germany resembles Norway with regard to a long tradition for close inter-linkages between 
energy companies and the public authorities, i.e. the Federal state, the Bundesländer and 
municipalities. The interaction takes place on different arenas and in different forms, of which 
subsidies, regulations, lobbyism and ownership are the most important (Corbach 2007, BMWi 
2008, Gammelin & Hamann 2006). As a net energy importer, security of supply has always 
been crucial for Germany. The authorities have therefore prioritised policy measures 
enhancing domestic energy production, including heavy subsidising of coal production and 
public funding of R&D of nuclear power (Storchmann 2005, Scheer 2006). In recent years, 
there has been an increased focus on RES, which besides reinforcing domestic energy 
production contributes to the reduction of GHG emission (see also chapter 4).  
5.2.1 Powerful electricity companies 
The close connection between state and industry is above all a consequence of political 
decisions taken during the emergence of the electricity sector in the end of the 19
th
 century. 
The first energy companies in Germany were partly state owned. Private, state and municipal 
shareholders participated in the emerging regional networks. For example, in 1914, half of the 
shares in Rheinisch Westfälische Energiewerke (RWE) were owned by municipalities and the 
other half by private companies. Preussische Elektrizitäts AG was mainly state owned. In 
1913, purely private companies accounted for 26% of capacity and the municipalities had a 
controlling interest in all but one of twenty-five regional companies (Millward 2005:134-135, 
141).   
 In 1935, the Energy Industry Law (Gesetz zur Förderung der Energiewirtschaft) was 
passed, which promulgated that all investments in power generation and in the transmission 
grid had to be approved by the Minister of Economics. The law encouraged a monopoly 
position of the deliverance companies and at the same time set them under a supply duty 
(Dahlmanns 1990:236). The reasons for the Law were to ensure that “the consumption of 
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energy was in the interest of the common welfare and to avoid damaging economic effects of 
competition”. It was argued that “energy supply is an important good, which should be 
available for all citizens to the same conditions, no matter if he or she lives in a city or far 
away from existing infrastructure” (Fröhler 2001:230).  Because of the inconvenience this 
implies for the supplier, he was guarantied a (time restricted) regional monopoly, i.e. a certain 
area in which no other energy supplier would be granted the permission to produce or deliver 
energy. The Energy Industry Law remained the basis of the German Energy industry until the 
liberalisation in 1998 (Fröhler 2001:229-230). 
After the Second World War, there was a strong tendency towards public (state or 
municipal) ownership in most of Europe, and the grip of central Government was reinforced. 
The Germans had a deep suspicion towards the state sector after the war, and the German 
state sector was therefore not expanded. Nevertheless, the Law of 1935 remained unchanged 
and after 1946, the Federal Government of West Germany had extensive holdings in a large 
part of the energy industry. This also applied to the power transmission grid, which was taken 
care of by nine companies, of which four were state owned, five were state owned to 50% or 
more, and the last was RWE with 30% state ownership. (Millward 2005:140, 176). East 
Germany turned into a socialist nation state with a centrally planned economy. This had major 
implications for the energy sector, which was kept under state control until the unification 
with West Germany 1990 (Fröhler 2001). 
 The ownership structure of the West German infrastructure industries and 
manufacturing was an inheritance rather than the result of a conscious drive to public 
ownership (Millward 2005:179). Many historians and commentators in several countries have 
wanted to see the origins and ideology behind state enterprise in their country as rather 
distinctive. Until 1950, this was nevertheless a common pattern. The problems inherent in 
network industries and the technological developments in the supply of infrastructure services 
had forced public authorities to intervene quite strongly. As late as 1963, public ownership 
accounted for 81% of the investments in the West German energy sector. State ownership in 
the electricity sector took the form of joint stock companies with the state owning from 25% 
to 100% of the shares (Millward 2005:181-182). From the 1960s, German electricity 
production gradually was gradually privatised (Wengeroth 2000:121). In the 1980s, the state 
and the Bundesländer reduced their participation in the energy sector to a large degree, and 
many of the companies experienced progressive privatization. At municipal level, 50% public 
participation remained standard, with reference to arguments of security of supply 
(Dahlmanns 1990:237, Adamek & Otto 2008:52).  
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 In 1990, former West and East Germany were unified. The two countries differed 
strongly in the organisation of their economies and energy sectors. This has had major 
implication for the setting of the German Kyoto target and its achievement, as the East 
German Energy sector was characterised by low energy efficiency (see chapter 4.4). 
The time after the German unification coincided with the efforts of the EU to liberalise 
the grid bounded energy markets and to establish a European single market (Fröhler 2001:1-
2). After several years of negotiation, the Energy ministers of the EU agreed upon a 
liberalisation of the EU electricity industry. The EU electricity directive prescribed an 
opening of the electricity market within 2006 (Fröhler 2001:235).  
 Despite of extensive privatization, the German energy industry is still closely 
interlinked with policy. The activities are carried out by approximately seven associations, 
hundred sector groups and 1500 official access managers. The lobby activity is 
comprehensive, and the lobbyists have close connections to some of the Members of the 
Bundestag (The German Parliament) (Gammelin & Hamann 2005:194-195). There are also 
economic as well as personal interweavements, and there are many politicians that are 
represented in the energy companies’ boards of management (Corbach 2007:13). The 
liberalisation of the German energy market and introduction of the modified Energy Act of 
1998 was difficult to carry out. According to Fröhler, this was not only a consequence of the 
technical and legal peculiarities of the energy sector, but to a large degree the industry’s close 
relationship and mutual exertion of influence of the authorities (Fröhler 2001:229). The latter 
is an issue still widely debated in Germany. Many authors have written about the huge 
influence from the energy industry in the making of the new Energy Act of 2005 and have 
questioned whether the large impact from energy companies in the making of policy should 
be allowed (Gammelin & Hamann 2006, Adamek & Otto 2008, Leif & Speth 2006). Mez has 
described the German energy industry as an economic and political power cartel which is able 
to prevent attempts to change the present energy policy at all levels of execution (Mez 
1996:158 in Corbach 2007). 
 The four largest companies dominate today the German electricity market to 80%, and 
RWE and E.on control 2/3 of the gas market. The four large companies own 100% of the 
power and gas grid (Gammelin & Hamann 2005:203-207, Kemfert & Traber 2008:178, 
Adamek & Otto 2008:55-56). After the liberalisation of the energy market in 1998, a large 
market occurred where new actors where allowed to offer electricity without power stations of 
their own. As a result, the prices declined by as much as 50% for industry customers and 20% 
for private households. But it took only two years before the electricity and gas suppliers had 
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readapted to the market and established an oligopolistic market structure. More than eight 
companies merged into four: Viag and Veba merged into E.on AG, the largest supplier in 
Europe, RWE merged with VEW into the second largest supplier in Europe, Vattenfall took 
over Bewag, Veag and HEW in the Neue Bundesländer and frensch EdF bought holdings in 
EnBW. According to Kemfert & Traber (2008:179), Germany never really introduced an 
energy policy based on competition in a free market. In 2003, the energy prices rose again and 
the EU commission intervened and demanded a controlling authority to watch the market – 
already common practise in all other EU countries – to be passed by July 2004. Because of 
strong resistance from the energy industry and intense lobby activity, it took three years for 
Germany to create the new Energy Industry Law. The law ensures that everyone who wants 
should be able to transport electricity and gas through the infrastructure grids as long as they 
pay a reasonable fee.  
According to Gammelin & Hamann (2005), the creation of the new Energy Act 2005 
was highly influenced by the energy companies. The Minister of Energy and Technology 
consulted the executive boards of the energy companies before the law was passed, and 
lobbyists contributed to the formulation of important paragraphs. The policy executive of 
RWE confirmed the cooperation, which was characterised as fruitful because it helped the 
employees in the Ministry to keep the overview of increasingly complex information and 
interests (Kemfert & Traber 2008:179, Gammelin & Hamann 2005:215-216). 
5.2.2 Nuclear energy policy 
Germany has 17 operating nuclear power reactors, comprising 21% of installed capacity.  
The production of electricity in nuclear power plants in Germany goes back to the 1950s. In 
1957 the research reactor at Munich technical university was set into operation and in 1959 
the Law for nuclear energy is passed that confirms the promotion of nuclear energy. 1961 the 
power plant Kahl was the first nuclear power plant to produce electricity for public purposes 
in Germany. According to Scheer, the development of nuclear energy was made possible with 
large financial support from the authorities. In the OECD countries, the Governments have 
spent more than 300 billion USD on research and development on nuclear energy since the 
1950s and up to 1992. (West) Germany alone has since the 1950s subsidised developers of 
nuclear energy with 20 billion Euros for the construction of research reactors, nine milliards 
for failed projects (the fast breeder project among others) and 14.5 billion for waste disposal, 
restoration and the closing down of reactors (Scheer 2005:112). Nuclear power production in 
Germany has nevertheless been heavily disputed since the beginning of the 1970s, parallel 
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with the large scale development of nuclear power (Roose 2006:273). After decades of 
struggles between the people arguing for and against nuclear power, the German Government 
passed in 2000 the Law that ensures that all German nuclear power plants will be shut down 
within 2021.
41
  The exit (Ausstieg) from nuclear power production is still a disputed topic in 
German public debate, and proponents of extended operation permissions argue that climate 
policy is only possible combined with nuclear power production. A report from the Ministry 
of Economics and Technology published 2008 affirms that Germany’s energy security is not 
set in danger because of the exit from nuclear power.
42
 
5.2.3 Coal 
The coal policy has been a controversial topic in Germany for decades. For almost half a 
century, Germany has paid significant subsidies to the hard coal mining sector. In 2002, 
Germany provided almost 4 billion Euros in production related subsidies (Storchmann 2005). 
The subsidising of the German hard coal sector started with the “coal crisis” in 1958, when 
the costs for domestic coal rose dramatically compared to the world market level. In the 
period 1958 to 2002, the survival of the sector depended heavily on subsidies from the 
Federal Government and the mining Bundesländer totalling 157.7 billion Euros through 
public budgets and specific funds to guarantee a viable mining sector. The Federal 
Government accounted for 52% of the subsidies, 33% came from the fund “coal penny”43 
whereas the Bundesland North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) granted 14% (Storchmann 
2005:1473-1475). 
The policy to prioritise the coal sector led to a remarkable increase in the importance 
of hard coal in power generation. From being the smallest one, power generation turned into 
the biggest coal consumer compared to the heating and the steel market (Storchmann 
2005:1473). Despite the intention from every Government since 1966 to reduce the subsidies, 
coal aids peaked in 1989 with 7500 million EUR per year and remained at very high levels 
until the mid 1990s (Storchmann 2005). Since 1996, the aid has steadily declined, and in 
2008, the joint coal aid from the State and NRW will be almost 2400 million EUR per year. In 
2007, the state and Bundesländer agreed to end the subsidising of the hard coal sector by the 
end of 2018. The decision implies that from then on, the domestic supply of hard coal will 
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 The “coal penny” was a special fund outside the public budget financed by a coal levy on the price on 
electricity, and thus financed by all electricity consumers. In 1995, it averaged 8.5 % of the price on electricity. 
In 2002, sales aids accounted for almost 95 % of all coal subsidies. 
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only contribute to Germany’s energy production to a very small degree, as the domestic 
production can be replaced through imports without problems.
44
 
5.2.4 Renewable Energy Sources 
Development of renewable energy in Germany has become an increasing priority for German 
policy makers at national as well as regional level since the mid 1970s. Whereas the period 
between 1974 and 1989 almost entirely comprised research and demonstration measures, the 
time afterwards is characterised by major market creation and stimulation measures 
(Bechberger & Reiche 2006). This has resulted in a remarkable expansion of the renewable 
energy sector (see also chapter 4.4.1). In 2005, Germany occupied a world leading position in 
installed wind power with 31% of installed global capacity, and showed the strongest growth 
in newly installed photovoltaic (PV) – sharing first position with Japan in totally installed PV 
power capacity. It also ranked first in the production of bio fuels and installed solar thermal 
collector space in Europe. The German market for the latter is the biggest and most rapidly 
increasing one in Europe. In 2007, renewable energy sources accounted for 8.5% of total 
primary energy consumption and 14.2% of electricity consumption in Germany. Only two 
years earlier, the numbers were 4.6 and 10.2% respectively. Wind power increased by 28.7% 
from 2006 to 2007, and PV by 59.1% (BMWi 2008).  
Bechberger & Reiche (2006) identifies the successful RES development as a result of 
the following different driving forces: 1) the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG); 2) a 
comprehensive RES promotion approach with a lead market focus; 3) external pressure 
deriving from European and international commitments in RES policy and active climate 
protection; 4) a positive cognitive environment towards RES and 5) certain technical driving 
forces. The first point mentioned above is maybe the most important. One of the German 
Environmental Group interviewees talked about the EEG as a splendid and well working 
instrument for the development of RES. The EEG is a promotion instrument with feed-in 
tariffs used in Germany, Denmark and Spain, the leading wind energy countries in Europe. 
Almost 78% of EU-25s wind power capacity was installed in these countries by the end of 
2005. Feed-in tariffs guarantee investors a specific support for a certain time period. The size 
of the remuneration and the duration of the support period depend on what technology is used. 
This makes it possible to reach a broad technology mix. Germany has promoted renewable 
energy with feed-in tariffs since 1991. The EEG is designed such that the supply companies 
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are obliged to purchase the RES electricity and then pass the costs through to the consumers. 
Examples of the amount of the feed-in tariffs/kWh are 9.67 cEUR for Hydropower up to 500 
kW, 6.65 over 500 kW to 5 MW for a period of 30 years. Onshore wind energy receives 8.36 
cEUR in the beginning, followed by 5.28 cEUR as a basic tariff. Photovoltaic energy is 
granted approximately 50 cEUR. The idea behind feed-in tariffs is that with extended 
deployment of the new technology the operating costs decreases thanks to learning effects 
(improved technology). This can be measured with the corresponding progress ratio or the 
learning rate (Neij 1997). The Norwegian Government also considered the introduction of a 
common system for feed-in tarifs for development of RES with Sweden. When negotiations 
failed, the feed-in system was postponed indefinitely. As a consequence, the Norwegian level 
of RES support is much lower than the German level.  
The second force identified by Bechberger & Reiche (2006) is Germany’s ambition of 
becoming market leader, which implies the state’s willingness to bear the initial risks and 
development costs of the innovations until they reach market competitiveness. The successful 
development of RES and the fact that RES have become an important economic factor is 
considered as an evidence for Germany’s official market leading ambition. The Ministry of 
Economics and Technology also terms development of RES as a central aim of the Federal 
Governments energy policy. The total turnover for German renewable energy industries in 
2007 was 24.6 billion EUR, an increase by almost 10 % from 2006. The total number of 
employees within the sector was 249.000 by the end of 2007.  The German RES policy is 
based on a mix of several measures. In addition to the EEG, there are other supporting 
programmes like the 100 000 Roof PV Programme and the Market Incentive Programme 
(MAP) with direct investment subsidies and soft loans.  
The European Union has also contributed to the promotion of RES in Germany through 
the Directive 2001/77/EC which stated that all EU member states should increase RES 
electricity consumption from 13.9% in 1997 to at least 21% in 2010. Germany’s individual 
target was set by 12.5%, starting from 4.5% in 1997. The target is already attained, and 
Germany is thus one of the few EU member states to reach its goal (Bechberger & Reiche 
(2006).
45
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
The interaction between state and industry actors in the energy sector goes back to the 19
th
 
century in both Norway and Germany. The state has played an active role in the development 
of the sector as owner or partly owner of power stations, energy companies and transmission 
grids. It has also been important as investor in new constructions and through subsidising 
research and development. In Germany this is the case for coal production in particular, but 
development of nuclear energy has also been granted considerable financial support. 
Norwegian petroleum production has also been largely dominated by the state since the first 
findings were made in the North Sea in 1969. To ensure active participation in the petroleum 
sector on all levels, Statoil and SDFI was established in early 1970s.  
These were intended political decisions based on the energy system’s importance for 
the society. State ownership within the electricity sector remained more or less stable up to 
the liberalisation of the sector in the 1980s and 1990s in Germany and Norway respectively. 
Most of the German energy companies were privatised, and a large part of them merged. In 
2008, the four largest companies dominate 80% of the market and control the transmission 
grid to100%. The interaction between public and private actors in Germany has nevertheless 
continued, to a large degree in the form of lobbyism. In Norway, public ownership still 
dominates the energy sector, but the role of state and municipalities has changed. In the 21
st
 
century, the Norwegian state’s presence in the energy sector is above all as a major 
shareholder in energy companies that have turned into profit oriented companies on the 
international market.  
In both countries, it is well documented that energy and petroleum companies lobby 
towards the energy bureaucracy. The role of the state in the development of RES takes place 
first of all through financial support to developers. These support tariffs are much higher in 
Germany than in Norway, which have led to a considerable development within this sector 
over the past ten years (see chapter 4).  
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6 Empirical findings 
This chapter presents the empirical findings. The field work was conducted according to my 
first two research questions, which aim at examining climate perception and its implication 
for personal behaviour. Chapter five reveals that extensive cooperation between public and 
private parts of the energy sector is the case. I nevertheless discovered large differences in the 
sectors climate perception during the gathering and structuring of the empirical data. As 
accounted for in 3.1.2, it was possible to organise the interviewees from the public sector into 
two groups of institutions, which I termed public/energy and public/environmental group. A 
third group represents the interviewees from private sector. In the following sections, I shall 
present the climate perceptions found in Norway and Germany group by group. The 
discussion about differences between the groups takes place in chapter seven, where the main 
analysis is conducted. According to explanation-based theory, the structuring of empirical 
findings into groups of institutions is nevertheless also an analytical performance, as new 
terms are established that build a base line for the presentation and the further analysis of the 
data gathered in the field.  
 
Several dimensions of disagreement among the interviewees could be located: 
1. Whether climate change (CC) is anthropogenic and avoidable 
2. Whether national energy policies are reasonable in relation to climate change 
3. How is the distribution of responsibility and the role of the individual when it comes 
to mitigating climate change 
4. To what degree CC will affect society and the interviewees’ daily lives  
5. Whether CC is perceived as a threat that they worry about. 
 
The interviews are hence categorised and presented with respect to the following categories: 
A. IPCC’s prognoses 
B. Consequences of CC 
C. Energy policy versus climate policy 
D. Personal responsibility and behaviour 
E. Worry 
F. The strategy of the company (for the private group only) 
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6.1 The public/environmental group 
The interviewees in this group were: 
Norway: Martha, Karen and Sara. 
Germany: Karl, Paulina, Bill and John. 
A. IPCC’s Prognoses 
The members of the public/environmental group were all convinced that climate change is 
taking place and that it is a serious problem. They argued that the IPCC is a very credible and 
serious panel of scientists from all over the world. Several of the interviewees in this group 
gave detailed accounts for the work process of the IPCC, to illustrate the scientific validity of 
IPCC’s work. “I do not know any other topic worldwide that scientists all over the world 
discuss and validate, with such continuity over decades,” Karl said. Some of the Norwegians 
mentioned that the prognoses are frightening. They also believed that the prognoses are rather 
conservative, “because of the way the IPCC reports are produced where they have to attain 
consensus between different researchers from all over the world” (Martha). Both Martha and 
Karen thought climate change was happening faster in reality than what is communicated in 
the media. One reason for this was the melting of the ice caps in 2007 that happened much 
faster than predicted by the scientists. Bill also thought the estimations for temperature 
increase were set too low, based on the experiences from 2007 when “the prognoses for 
temperature increases were set higher over and over again.” John argued that with 95% 
probability, there is no doubt around the basic problem anymore, i.e. whether we humans are 
responsible for it or not.   
B. Consequences of CC 
When asked about consequences of CC for Norway, the Norwegian interviewees in this group 
listed the following: Changes in weather, i.e. more precipitation, more often and more intense 
rain and more storms. We may have to regard these factors when we build new houses and 
infrastructure in the future. Also when it comes to energy production, we may have to 
introduce new criteria for construction dimensioning, which again will involve remarkable 
societal costs. CC will affect our glaciers and the geological situation because of changed 
risks for landslides, which will affect settlements with regard to where we can settle and 
increased risks for existing settlements. Warmer temperatures will have consequences for our 
fishery, as fish stocks will move. An intensified climate policy will among others cause 
changes within the transport sector, for example through increased fuel prices. Martha 
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reflected upon the possibility for a change in the industry structures, which may lead to a 
closing down of polluting production units. There were agreement that Norway will not be 
among the worst affected countries in the world, and that it will probably not be hit by 
droughts and loss of harvests as is the case for many other countries. All interviewees 
regarded it as likely that we must be prepared to receive refugees from harder affected 
countries in the south in a long term perspective.  
The German members of this group emphasised that Germany will not be the hardest 
affected country. However, there will be national consequences in terms of more extreme 
weather, warmer temperatures, new species occur while other disappear and melting of 
glaciers in the alps that lead to lower water level in the large rivers, they said. Some of the 
interviewees accounted for the prediction that different parts of the country will be differently 
affected. The southern and western part will have more rain and floods, whereas the northern 
and eastern part will rather have a problem with drought. Bill doubted that it was possible to 
foresee different forecasts for different regions, but he agreed with the others that it gets 
warmer and that flora and fauna are changing. Changes in the natural environment will have 
consequences for forestry, agriculture and water supply/distribution. The German 
interviewees expected that this will lead to increased national economic costs. John foresaw 
that the insurance sector might refuse to ensure people living in certain areas because the risk 
of living there will become too high. The German public/environmental group also stressed 
the risk of international instabilities because of climate change. If nothing is done to mitigate 
climate change, it will probably come to huge migration movements because many areas will 
not be habitable. We may experience water shortage, food shortage, energy shortage and this 
may even cause wars. Several of the German interviewees were therefore very enthusiastic 
about the fact that the Nobel Peace Prize 2007 was given to Al Gore and the IPCC. “It was a 
genial decision, because it made clear that climate protection is peace policy. This connection 
is strong,” Karl said.  
C. Energy policy versus climate policy 
The public/environmental group expressed general satisfaction with the national climate 
policy, both aims and measures, in their respective countries. Some of the Norwegians argued 
that the Norwegian aims are more ambitious than those of the EU. However Karen expressed 
discontent with the support level and regime for development of renewable energy. She 
argued that Norway has a large potential for renewable energy, but because of low financial 
support, a lot of projects are not realised. Sara was satisfied with the increase in support for 
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the restructuring of energy use in private households and industry, and with the ambition to 
increase the public financial support for research and development on RES twice by 2010. 
The Germans characterised the German climate policy as ambitious, but considered this as 
positive and necessary. The policy has lead to a massive development in the renewable energy 
sector, both within Germany and for export purposes. Several of the interviewees referred to 
the McKinsey-study (see chapter 4.2.2) and the calculations made there, which show that 
several of the reduction measures actually pay off when they are carried through. John also 
talked about another study made by Vattenfall, which illustrates that there are other barriers 
for emission reductions than economic costs; lack of information, institutions are not 
designed/constructed for energy saving, legitimate and administrative barriers.  
The Norwegians were optimistic on behalf of Norway’s odds to reach the announced 
target which proclaim that emissions will be reduced with 15-17 million tonnes by 2020. The 
Norwegian Government has not yet composed the final package of measures that ensures that 
Norway will attain the prescribed emission reduction, but the Norwegian interviewees were 
moreover optimistic that the aspired reduction will be accomplished. “We do not have a full 
overview now of what possibilities for reduction we will have in 2020,” Martha said, thus 
implicating that there will be new possibilities for emission reductions in the future. Karen 
started out being optimistic about Norway’s capability to undertake the announced reductions, 
but then hesitated after thinking it over again, because “2020 will be here in a very short 
time.”  
The majority of the Germans were also optimistic about that Germany will reach its 
aim of cutting emissions with 40% by 2020. The German interviewees held this for possible, 
but emphasised that this presupposes political will and action. “It will not happen by itself”, 
Paulina said. Bill was the only one who was pessimistic about Germany’s chances for 
achieving its ambitious reduction aims, “of the simple reason that we had an increase in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions in the last years.” He also thought that many of the 
measures will be expensive, and even though Germany will have the money for them, he 
questioned whether it will be possible for the politicians to execute the planned changes: “I 
am a person who is ready to do more to reach the aims. We have a responsibility to reach 
them, also towards coming generations. But a politician thinks and speaks differently because 
he always has to be elected.” Bill nevertheless found it exclusively positive that the 
Government goes “quite far” in this direction; “One must set the targets and try to reach them, 
but I do not believe that we will”. John was convinced that the energy consumption will 
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decline, for two reasons: Firstly because of the increased focus on CC and energy efficiency 
and secondly because of the rise in energy prices. 
In both countries, there was agreement that it is important to cut emissions nationally, 
even though it may be less expensive to cut them abroad. The following arguments were 
mentioned to justify this opinion: It is important to show that we take responsibility for our 
own emissions – if we just buy quotas it has a very bad symbolic effect. It is also a demand 
from developing countries that developed countries take their share. According to the IPCC 
report, the cut in emissions globally must be so comprehensive that developed as well as 
developing countries must undertake reductions.  
Some interviewees argued that if there was a perfectly functioning CO2-market and a 
global price on CO2 these national aims would maybe not be necessary – but this is not the 
case. Others claimed that one can not act only according to economic rules in international 
politics. Especially the Germans emphasised that national emission reductions are extremely 
important to mark internationally that such a policy is necessary and possible. Germany’s 
climate strategy will serve as an example for the rest of the world that it is possible to reduce 
emissions without economic loss. All German interviewees mentioned the fact that many of 
the measures are profitable. John and Karl accentuated the conclusion of the Stern report; that 
the price of CC is much higher than the price of mitigating it. Those two were also eager to 
convey that climate protection is rather a possibility for the economy than an obstacle. “The 
renewable energy sector is in the meantime the most successful and growing sector of the 
German economy,” Karl said. National emission reductions may also be important for 
technology development in Norway, in order for the country to develop a research effort in 
the field of renewable energy. This may have an effect for the future Norwegian economy, 
one which is difficult to include in the calculation of the costs of emission reduction. The 
Norwegians argued that it is important for Norway to develop new industry for the time after 
the production of oil and gas has ceased. 
D. Personal responsibility and behaviour 
This is very difficult. How much personal responsibility has people in rich Norway 
for starving people in Africa?” Interviewer: “But in this situation we can contribute 
a little bit more?” “No we can not. It is a global problem. I can not personally make 
sure that the world’s emissions are cut with 50 – 80% by 2050 (Martha).  
When asked about personal responsibility with regard to mitigation of CC, the interviewees in 
this group were clear about that the individual has a responsibility. The group was divided 
about whether the main responsibility lies with the authorities or the individual. There was the 
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opinion that one can do a lot through more conscious behaviour and reduce where it is 
possible in one’s everyday life. At the same time, many of the interviewees stressed that the 
authorities are responsible for facilitating measures so that the citizens can make climate 
friendly choices in their everyday life. Social structures are very important for what we are 
able to do. Martha hence claimed that the individual’s main responsibility is as a voter, and 
that it is the duty of each citizen to ensure “that we have the politicians that enforce the 
necessary political action.”  
One of the Germans held personal responsibility to be the main issue when it comes to 
mitigate climate change. Bill argued that “everybody has to ask themselves where they can 
save energy in their daily lives.” He regarded it as a basic responsibility that every citizen has. 
According to Bill, the personal responsibility must come in the first place, and subsequently 
comes the responsibility of the authorities and the politicians.  
Some of the interviewees addressed the dilemma that the citizens as consumers are 
limited to choose the possibilities that are available on the market. If there is no adequate 
public transport system, it is difficult to restrain from driving a car, Paulina said. On the other 
hand, John claimed that “the market is for the consumers and produce only what they 
demand.” In general, there was the belief that the citizen has power as a consumer, and that 
she can choose energy saving solutions in all areas of his daily life. John described each 
individual’s possibilities to reduce GHG emissions as “immense”, and lists up a long row of 
things she can do. The German interviewees nevertheless did not believe that people will 
change because of climate change, but because the prices on energy has increased, and will 
continue to increase.  
When it came to what they can do themselves, most of them had reflected a lot around 
this. Many of them gave detailed accounts for what they do and could have done, and also for 
discussions in their every day life on the topic. Karen explained how energy consumption has 
become a much more debated issue in people’s lives, and that people are much more 
conscious about this now than just a few years ago. Above all, this is centred on energy 
saving. John told that his family managed to cut the energy consumption in their household 
with 30% through mobilising the whole family. The Germans all travelled mainly by public 
transport, and they had purchased energy saving lamps and other electric devices. Bill would 
like to buy a “passive house” and expected to live in one in 20 years from now. The 
dependency on cars was for most of the Norwegians the biggest contributor to GHG 
emissions in their private life. At the same time they described it as very difficult to abandon, 
due to the lack of adequate alternatives. All interviewees expressed willingness to abstain 
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from goods because of climate if necessary. Bill was also very sceptical about air travel. He 
expressed severe concern for the development in this sector: 
I find it catastrophic that we have these cheap airlines where you can travel for 35 
Euro to Tenerife. It stands in no relation to the damage one causes. […] And how 
can I, as society, say: I do not care, I want to have fun, I party as long as there is 
oil, it will be possible another 20-30 years and what comes afterwards, my children 
or the Third World do not interest me. It simply does not work.  
E. Worry 
Within the Norwegian public/environmental group, all interviewees expressed worry. Above 
all, they are worried on behalf of the next generation and their children. “I am also worried in 
a North-South perspective, because I see this creates a lot of misery in the world. It is pretty 
awful what we see is about to happen,” Martha said. Karen said that she finds it difficult not 
to worry because “there are so many signals, alone by looking at the weather. It looks like 
there are a lot of changes going on, all over the world. It is frightening. It is accelerating”. 
 The Norwegians were nevertheless optimistic on behalf of our ability to do something 
to change the development. Sara told that she knew people that are very worried, but that her 
own reaction is rather that she wants to do something about it, that she gets the feeling “we 
are going to make it!” Martha argued that according to the IPCC the technology to undertake 
necessary emission reductions is available: “What lacks is political will from the world’s 
leaders.”  
The German interviewees did not worry about climate change directly. This was 
because they did not believe it will affect Germany and themselves personally, at least not in 
many years still to come. “We in industrial countries will probably be affected […] but not 
threatened in the meaning that we will be deprived of our life foundation,” Paulina said. Few 
of them thought that CC will be noticeable for them personally. “Here in the city we will not 
notice it very much. We have an old apartment in an old house with thick walls,” Karl said. 
The reason to mitigate climate change is not because of the threat towards themselves, but 
because of the responsibility towards countries and people who are worse off. The majority 
mentioned the possibility of future wars as a result of climate change, which was perceived as 
scary, but not as a personal threat. Bill’s description was denotative for the whole group:  
I think many see it as I do: CC will not affect Germany that directly. Many people 
are not sad that the winter is no longer that cold. Everybody is happy when the sun 
is shining, when the summer is warm, most people I know go out, drink a beer and 
do not find it bad that there are more sunny days than there used to be. Climate 
change for us now, in our daily lives, is not that bad. 
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6.2 The public/energy group 
The interviewees in this group were: 
Norway: Torben, Alex, Sylvia and Eric. 
Germany: Chris, Robert and George. 
A. IPCC’s prognoses 
The Norwegian members of the public/energy group were divided in their view on the IPCC 
and their prognoses. Half of the group assumed their prognoses are correct, but Torben added 
that he did not have any personal opinion about them. Torben also told me that he used to be a 
“climate sceptic”, but that he had changed his view because of the Norwegian precipitation 
development, which for him was an indication that climate change is taking place. The other 
half of the group shared the view of the German interviewees, who were uncertain whether 
the IPCC’s prognoses are realistic and credible. Eric said directly that he did not believe in 
their predictions. Sylvia said she held IPCC to be a serious research panel, but she did not 
believe it would get that bad as they foresee.  
Most of the Germans emphasised that they could not evaluate the findings themselves, 
but they doubt whether climate change will have the consequences that the IPCC foresees in 
their 4
th
 assessment report. Chris doubted whether manmade CO2 emissions can eventually 
cause such changes in nature and hence whether it would be possible to stop the ongoing 
trend by reducing GHG emissions. George stressed that he would not say that IPCC’s 
prognoses are wrong, but pointed at the impossibility of making prognoses of nature. He 
argued that these prognoses are based on models, which is always a simplification of reality. 
The topic was apparently a controversial issue for the German interviewees in this group. 
Robert argued that “there are also others who say something else. But it is not allowed to 
discuss such facts anymore, because IPCC has turned into the board of inquisition. I always 
find it problematic when someone says he has the final truth.” The majority of the group 
pointed to the matter of fact that the climate has always been changing. Therefore, we can not 
necessarily relate the changes we now observe to anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
B. Consequences of CC 
When asked about the consequences of CC, the interviewees in the public/energy group 
responded differently than the climate group. They were all aware of the predictions of the 
climate researchers, but where the public/environmental group said “it will get warmer,” the 
public/energy group used such formulations as: “We will allegedly get more and heavier 
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rain.” “Allegedly, it gets warmer.” “We will probably have rougher weather.” The German 
interviewees were sceptical about that climate change will lead to specific changes in the 
natural environment or for the society. George argued that “things will change, but in what 
direction and to what extent one can not say, in my opinion.” Chris said “I still regard the 
incidences that have occurred within the last years more as weather events rather than a 
climate topic”. The Germans expressed scepticism about the assumption that climate change 
will lead to catastrophic-resembling circumstances. “We do not know if it will become that 
dramatic,” Robert said. All of them thought Germany would be one of the least affected 
countries when it comes to changes in the natural environment. They argued that the changes 
would be of such a character that it will not affect Germany’s inhabitants noticeably.  
Torben said that if the IPCC are right in their prognoses, there will be huge changes in 
the world, but for Norway isolated it won’t necessarily be that bad. There will probably be an 
increase amount of asylum seekers who are climate refugees. Eric said that flora and fauna 
will change; “but again – it always has. Therefore, it will not affect us very much, and we will 
manage to adapt.” The majority of the Norwegians argued that what would really affect us is 
if the politicians force different climate measures upon us that could become very expensive 
and dramatic. They thus believed that the social and economic consequences will become far 
more significant than the changes in climate and weather themselves. 
C. Energy policy versus climate policy 
If we are going to achieve 20-25% emission reduction compared to today’s 
emissions, we depend on a technological breakthrough. If we do not manage to get 
the technological solutions, it will cost a lot of blood sweat and tears, and I do not 
think the Norwegian society is willing to do that. Then I think we should rather buy 
quotas abroad. If we are going to solve the problem we have to cut emissions 
where it is cheapest (Torben). 
The interviewees in the public/energy group were very critical about the climate policy in 
their respective countries. The Norwegians characterised the Norwegian policy as a symbolic 
policy and a policy of indulgence. “It is very convenient to set aims for 2050,” Alex argued. 
The German interviewees described their national climate policy as very ambitious. They 
expressed the opinion that if one really believes GHG emissions is a serious problem, one 
should act accordingly. The proposed measures were nevertheless regarded as very difficult to 
achieve because the reduction potential in Germany is limited. To achieve such major 
reductions within 2020 is not wise, because one neither knows the costs nor the consequences 
of this policy: “In my opinion, it will be very difficult to achieve the 40% reduction aim. Our 
burden sharing aim is 21% reduction by 2012. 40% hence means a doubling of this aim in the 
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following eight years, which is a very difficult case. The 20% aim is already enormous,” 
Chris said. He also argued that most of the reduction has happened because of the German 
unification. Both Norwegians and Germans shared the opinion that Norway and Germany are 
responsible for a very small part of the world’s emissions, and even if they reduce their 
emissions to zero, it will not have any effect on the world’s climate at all.  
The interviewees further questioned the fact that Germany and Norway as national 
economies spend so much money on technology development, CCS in particular, which no 
one knows whether will be applied or is going to work or at all, while other countries do not 
pay any attention to climate protection. “We are building constructions for CCS at the cost of 
many many billion kroner. What is happening at Kårstø is madness in my opinion.46  It is because we 
have too much money. So I think we do more than enough. It is exaggerated. I think the climate debate 
in Norway has a very national focus,” Alex said. There was also severe scepticism toward both 
the Norwegian and the German Governments’ ambitions to be pioneer countries. Some 
interviewees doubted that it will have any influence on other countries. “As a Chinese or 
Indian, the German good example would not impress me very much,” Robert said. 
Robert was also concerned about that the initiated climate policy will lead to an 
enormous rise in energy prices. He claimed that the announced climate policy will become 
very expensive for the consumers, and that the politicians are trying to fool the population by 
telling them the opposite: “This [climate policy] costs a lot of money, also for private 
households, which again will cause social problems. […] People talk about unemployment 
benefits. That is ridiculous when you look at what happens in the energy policy!”  
Some interviewees in both Norway and Germany had the impression that the reduction 
aims were set par hazard and not based on thoroughly calculated estimations for reduction 
potential in different sectors of society.  The quantification of emission reductions was 
perceived rather as a political gesture that gets a lot of attention in the media. “It is true that 
we have to care about the topic, but we could handle it more structured; slower and more 
reasonable,” Robert argued. Both Robert and Chris were sceptical about the calculations from 
the Fraunhofer Institut that predict that the measures suggested in Meseberg would lead to a 
certain emission reduction: “You know there are no exact calculations. Everyone makes their 
own calculations […] There are no calculations without controversy and in my opinion there 
are no serious calculations at present,” Robert argued. Chris said that “the tendency and 
                                                 
46
 The Norwegian Government will construct a full scale CCS facility for a gasfired power at Kårstø on the 
Western coast of Norway. [http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/carbon-capture-and-storage/karsto-
carbon-capture-and-storage-projec.html?id=502211] (12.11.08)  
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political opinion is that it [to reduce national emissions with 40%] is feasible. But it has many 
premises! It would mean incredible efforts in the case of [energy] efficiency. We have to 
increase that by 3% every year. For the moment, the figure is 1%.”  
When asked whether Norway could or should have put up more ambitious aims, the 
Norwegian interviewees understood this as a question about how many quotas we should buy 
abroad, not whether we should implement harder regulations and measures nationally
47
. This 
was mainly because they considered it as impossible to achieve the aspired emission reduction 
nationally. Sylvia said that to reach the aims would be possible, but very expensive and 
demand very tough measures that the population most probably would not agree upon. Torben 
claimed that the achievement of the aims depends on CCS, which “we do not know if will be 
applicable until 2020 because it is difficult to order research results.”  
The emission trading scheme and a common price on CO2 were considered to be the 
best measures for emission reductions by most of the interviewees in this group, though one 
interviewee argued that the price on carbon has to go up if it shall have any effect. Alex could 
not imagine that we will have an international quota market that works in any foreseeable 
future because it is so complex.  
In both countries, their beliefs about global possibilities for emission reductions 
influenced many of the interviewees’ perception of the national climate policy. Chris said that 
“It will not be possible to attain these 450 ppm48, I regard it as totally impossible. I therefore 
consider that what is going on as a kind of hysteria.” He contrasted the global emission 
reduction aim with the scenarios from the IEA, which predict up to 50% increase in energy 
demand. “We have to have a policy that makes reason in other aspects as well. Not only 
climate above everything else,” Chris concluded. Eric argued that because of the world’s need 
for fossil fuels the coming 40-50 years “we [Norwegians] can not just shut off the supply,” 
i.e., stop the production of oil. It was nevertheless his impression that the Norwegian 
Government understands and shares this perception. 
D. Personal responsibility and behaviour 
The general opinion in this group was that the individual is responsible to a certain degree, but 
that it is rather small things that each person can do. Torben argued: “Everybody has a 
responsibility to behave decently. Then again, it is the Government’s and the politicians’ 
responsibility to come up with sensible policies. But even though everybody should behave 
                                                 
47
 The Norwegian aim is to reduce 30% by 2020. Even though the Government has announced to undertake 2/3 
of this reduction nationally, it is still disputed whether this will be feasible (See chapter 4.3.2). 
48
 The IPCC has recommended a stabilisation of GHG in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2e (See 4.2). 
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decently, there are many who do not do that. Therefore, the most important is to have a price 
on CO2.” The German interviewees agreed that each individual has a responsibility to save 
energy in his or her private life. Most of the interviewees in the public/energy group stressed 
that they were already very conscious about energy consumption in their private life, but that 
this was not because of the threat of CC. “It is always a good thing to have a conscious energy 
use,” Robert said. George explained that he barely uses his car – which is very energy 
efficient any way, has energy saving bulbs in his whole house and does not know what he 
could have done to reduce emissions further.  
Several interviewees argued they did not think it is the individual’s responsibility to 
calculate his or her annual GHG emissions. The consideration to give each person a certain 
CO2-quota is not considered as a good idea, and Eric characterised this as Puritanism and self-
torture. George stated that it was not his hobby to save CO2, and Chris that “I am not going to 
chasten myself to save some kilogram CO2”. Eric said:  
Of course everybody has a responsibility, but it easily becomes too much. I do not 
think about how much energy it takes to produce a product I buy, and I think it is 
kind of weird to do so. […] I agree that if you believe that it is necessary to reduce 
our energy consumption, it is the individual that ultimately does it. I just do not 
think that it is going to happen. We human beings are a little too far from that, I 
suppose.”  
 Alex’ point of view was that the main obstacle to mitigate CC is the simple fact that most 
people want to maximize their own standard of living. Several of the interviewees said that 
they will not stop flying on vacation because of climate change, and to think anyone else does 
is totally unrealistic. If one wants people to change anything, it has to be in their own interest 
in one or another way. “No one changes car when the hybrid car is much more expensive,” 
Alex said. In contrast to the public/environmental group, which positively described all the 
possibilities each individual has to do something, the interviewees in the public/energy group 
saw these possibilities as very limited and rather moralising. This was also connected to the 
dominating assumption that personal behaviour is of very little importance. Alex said: “It 
does not matter at all what you do personally, because you do not have any cause-
effectiveness.”  
In accordance with their view upon the significance of personal behaviour, the 
interviewees in this group told that they have barely changed anything themselves in their 
private lives. Most of them explained that they had always had a conscious relationship to 
energy use, while Alex said that what he does is rather because of economic or practical 
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reasons than because of CC. Many of them said that they did not know what more they could 
do. “I consider it a bad idea to buy a hydrogen car for 2 million Euros,” Chris said. 
The majority of the interviewees in this group did not experience that people in their 
surroundings had changed their behaviour because of CC. “On the contrary,” Alex said; 
“People have more money than ever before and the private consumption keeps increasing.” 
Sylvia claimed that because of what she termed a rather hysterical climate debate in the 
media, many people she knew say that they do not believe in climate change at all. Torben 
was more optimistic about a change in public opinion. He thought that “people are thinking 
about these things, but not very much.” He had noticed that people buy more effective cars 
and drive together with friends to a larger degree than before. 
E. Worry 
This group was the least worried of all three groups. Some of the interviewees did not worry 
at all, because they did not believe it will happen as bad as predicted. Some said they believe 
that we will solve the problem, and that if these things happen, they will happen so slowly that 
we will manage to solve the problems as they occur. Torben questioned the urgency and scale 
of the problem as presented in the media: “I do not think it is the world’s largest problem as 
Jens [Stoltenberg, the Norwegian prime minister] says, because there is a lot of war and 
hunger and diseases in the world. But if it gets really bad, if it becomes 8-10 degrees warmer, 
it will become really horrible many places, and many things can happen, old diseases can 
occur again etc.” There was also the opinion that we can not do anything about it anyway – 
neither individually nor as a society. Chris said: „If there really is a change in climate I do not 
think we will be able to do something against it anyway“. He admitted that his point of view 
is an egoistic one: “In Germany it will not be that bad anyway. […] I am pessimistic with 
regard to the population outlook and therefore I say to myself: So what?” 
6.3 The private group 
The interviewees in this group were: 
Norway: Thomas, Fred and Elisa. 
Germany: Simon, Michael and Peter. 
A. IPCC’s prognoses 
The private group all agreed that the IPCC is a serious research panel and that their prognoses 
are credible. The Germans nevertheless emphasised that they did not have the competence to 
mean or think anything else. The majority of the interviewees in the private group gave 
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detailed accounts of the content of the 4
th
 assessment report and the fact that it states with 
increased certainty that anthropogenic climate change is happening faster and stronger than 
presumed in the previous reports. The private group was well informed about the IPCC’s 
work and perceived CC as a serious problem. The interviewees agreed that the climate 
researchers are now more certain in their statements, and pointed to the fact that observations 
show that CC is already taking place.  
Some of the Norwegians characterised the development as frightening. They also 
believed that CC will become worse than the IPCC predicts: “you can perhaps multiply it [the 
prognoses] with ten?” Thomas said. He had been to many meetings and conferences during 
the last year and met with specialists on the topic, who claim that the situation is much worse 
than what the IPCC says. Thomas argued that it is a fact that IPCC is always a little delayed in 
their statements because all involved parties have to agree upon every statement they make. 
 The Germans did not mention whether they thought it will be better or worse, but they 
expressed scepticism towards whether it will be as bad as it is often presented in the media, 
where “the world is either threatened by collapse or it is not a problem at all,” Simon said. 
Instead, the general attitude was that CC is a problem, which we have to do something about, 
but we can do it and the world will not go under. They therefore thought the discourse in the 
media was dominated by hysteria.  
B. Consequences of CC 
There was agreement about that Norway and Germany are not among the worst positioned 
countries in the world in terms of consequences of CC. The German interviewees did not 
think CC will be dramatic for Germany. The changes in the natural environment will not be 
impossible to cope with, and Germany has the money to undertake the necessary adaptation 
measures. The Norwegians too did not perceive the situation as directly threatening for their 
country. They argued that Norway will probably not suffer from droughts. Instead, there will 
be more rain and more extreme weather as storms and the like. “But if the sea level rises with 
six or seven meters, it will be really bad for Norway as well,” Thomas said. Some of the 
Norwegians mentioned that Norway may profit on CC because the agricultural sector will 
experience improved conditions. Also for the Norwegian industry it may be advantageous 
because Norway has a lot of clean energy, access to new technology and money to invest in 
research and development. Some of the power intensive industry may suffer, but other types 
of Norwegian industry may see this as a business idea.  
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The Germans believed that the major implications for Germany will be rising energy 
prices which lead to more energy saving and efficiency. This is already a hot topic for many 
people. Michael was therefore more concerned about the societal consequences than about 
changes in the natural environment. He also felt that the costs of the projected energy policy 
and the fact that energy will become much more expensive were under-communicated from 
the Government. He therefore believed that energy efficiency will play a larger role in his life 
and in the society in general. 
Distribution and justice questions were brought up by all interviewees. Fred 
questioned whether one can allow oneself to look at the consequences for Norway alone. 
Thomas said there may be more refugees coming, epidemics and changed economic 
circumstances. Because the world will be negatively affected, this will influence Norway and 
Germany as they are parts of a globalised world. Most of the interviewees mentioned the 
possibility for wars as an indirect effect and the understanding that climate politics is peace 
politics was also reflected upon.  
When it came to consequences for their own lives, the attitudes were diverging. Some 
of the interviewees did not believe that CC will affect them in their life time, whereas others 
said that we do not know what the consequences will be and mentioned the risk of that it 
could become really bad. 
C. Energy policy versus climate policy 
The interviewees in this group were quite dissatisfied with the climate policy in their 
respective countries, but Norwegians and Germans for different reasons. The majority of the 
Norwegians held the view that there has been a lot of talking and little action. Thomas 
characterised Norwegian politicians as weak and coward, because “they are doing so little.” 
He drew a parallel to Sweden, where half of the heating demand is covered with district 
heating based on bio energy – in Norway the figure is 3%. Fred argued that Norway’s policy 
is above all directed by the EU, and that we as a non-member have very little influence on 
EU’s climate and energy policy. “To compensate, we should have a lot of lobbyists 
everywhere possible in Brussel, and we do not have that.” In Fred’s opinion, the most 
important thing Norway could do in order to have a more ambitious climate and energy policy 
is to increase its influence in the EU.  
The Germans characterised their national policy as very ambitious, but also as 
contradictory. Michael argued that on the one hand, the politician’s main policy measure for 
the electricity sector is said to be the emission trading scheme. On the other hand, 52% of the 
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electricity market will be directed by subsidies by 2020, as 27% will be covered by the 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and 25% by the Act of Combined Heat and Power. He also 
criticised that some measures first of all promote the implementation of certain technologies, 
instead of aiming at improving efficiency. Simon argued that it is not possible to have a cost 
efficient climate policy if you want to abolish nuclear power. The Germans believed that a 
40% by 2020 would be possible, but argued that it will be very expensive and questioned 
where the money is going to come from. Therefore, they doubted whether this aim is 
reasonable in an economical perspective. Peter said that the reduction aims for 2020 are 
unnecessary, unreasonable and way too expensive. The reduction aim for 2050 is something 
else, Peter argued: “Until 2050, we have much more time. This is very important for the 
energy companies, because it takes a long time to change the energy production systems. For 
us, 2020 is so to say the day after tomorrow“. Michael suspected that the climate policy is part 
of the election strategy. 
 The Norwegians also doubted whether Norway will reach its emission reduction aim 
within 2020. The reason was above all insufficient public support levels for renewable energy 
and environmental friendly solutions. Elisa described cutting emissions with 20-25 % as 
demanding, but possible. “It nevertheless presupposes a totally different will for action”, she 
said. All Norwegians agreed that the policy for renewable energy and energy efficiency in 
Norway is too weak.  
With current measures I do not think it [the announced emmission redcution] is 
going to happen. We are not even close to anything happening – nothing is going to 
happen at all! So I do not believe in that. Of course, they could introduce measures 
that would make things happen. But I have difficulties to see it coming (Thomas).  
The Norwegians shared the opinion that it is important to cut emissions nationally, but if you 
can do it much cheaper abroad, it is not necessarily wise to do everything at home. “In a strict 
economic perspective, of course it would be more reasonable to cut more [emissions] abroad. 
But I think this is a question where you can not only have an economic perspective. […] One 
thing we can do is to develop technology and possibilities that can be used all over the 
world,” Elisa said. She argued that the politicians so far has focused more on Norway’s role in 
international negotiations than on what we can do nationally: “I think the will to act in 
Norway is small. The will to think international leadership is positive”.   
Contrary to the Norwegians, the German interviewees were rather sceptical about 
Germany’s ambition to be a pioneer. “It must not go too far,” Simon said: “The other 
countries must be able to follow.” Michael agreed that it would be better to get the other 
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nations onboard instead of marching in front. They therefore thought it would have been 
better if the EU had played the role of pioneer instead of Germany alone. Michael perceived 
the EU reduction target of 80% reduction by 2050 as extremely ambitious, but argued that 
according to the IPCC, it has to be. He said it is important that the politicians set such long-
term targets, among other things because of the emission trading.  
D. Personal responsibility and behaviour 
Within this group, there was a general opinion that the individual has a responsibility to do 
something. Some said they were uncertain how hard one should make the personal moral. 
Everybody can become more conscious, but the main responsibility lies with the political 
laws and strategies. “If we thought that it would solve the problem when each of us pulled 
ourself more together – forget it!” Elisa said. But she also addressed the individual’s power as 
a consumer, and argued that we as consumers have a responsibility to demand energy 
efficiency from companies and the products we buy. Some of the German interviewees 
argued that because each person contributes very little to climate change, the individual can 
not do very much with regard to reducing GHG emissions. They nevertheless emphasised that 
the individual can do a lot if she acts as a good example and informs other people about the 
problem.  
Peter addressed the problem that there are many people who do not care about climate 
change at all. There are also many people who are not able to do so, above all in developing 
countries but also in Germany, he argued. So to try to mitigate CC over lifestyle change is not 
very reliable. “It takes a very long time and one can not be sure that it will have the prescribed 
effect.” People do not want to abstain from their standard of living, and this is also not 
necessary, he argued. What we can and should do, is to use energy more efficient and 
cleverer, and construct high-efficient climate friendly and affordable energy systems. Such a 
strategy implies case-oriented solutions adjusted to each target group. “There is no one-size 
fits all. There is not one thing that solves everything. Politics always likes that, but there exists 
no such thing,” Peter concluded. Fred too was convinced that we have to combine increased 
consumption and economic growth with increased efficiency and cleaner power production, 
rather than to encourage people to reduce their consumption. Some of the Norwegians 
disagreed about this and argued that we as citizens have to consider if there is anything we 
can do less of.  
All interviewees in the private group had reflected on what they could do to save GHG 
emissions in their private life, but it had not had effectual consequences for all of them yet. 
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Some of them gave detailed explanations about what they did and could do in their private life 
to save energy and climate gas emissions. They mentioned alternative ways of heating, buying 
an electric car or a passive house, to travel less by airplane, to narrow personal consumption 
and to abstain from a big house. Michael said he pays attention to his inside temperature and 
travels by train when this is possible. Fred was first of all willing to pay more for things 
because of the climate. Peter had good consciousness with regard to his “climate footprint”, 
and did not see any large need for action in his private life as he has no car, does not travel by 
plane and the apartment he lives in does not belong to him – which means that he can not 
insulate it. The private group was nevertheless not as idealistic as the public/environmental 
group. 
E. Worry 
There was a remarkable difference between Norwegians and Germans when it came to how 
worried they were about climate change. The majority of the Norwegians expressed that they 
were sincerely worried. “I probably think about it every day,” Thomas said. All Norwegians 
were considering what this may mean for their own children, and this was one of their main 
reasons for concern. One of the Norwegians did nevertheless not worry personally, because he 
did not think CC will affect him the next 20 years.  
All of the Norwegians argued that in a longer perspective, climate change will have a 
real effect, if we do not manage to solve the problem. Still, they were optimistic on behalf of 
man and the earth’s ability to cope with the problem. There was the belief that a big part of 
the problem can be solved with new technological solutions and competence. Elisa and 
Thomas definitively thought they will experience severe changes in the time coming, and 
Thomas believed that he will be surrounded by more misery. Other consequences mentioned 
were increased insurance costs.  
The German interviewees in the private group were not worried for climate change in 
itself, but for the societal consequences it may bring about. However, Simon was certain that 
man will find a solution. But we must be ready to give up things that we have become used to, 
for example to sacrifice areas where we used to live, i.e., islands or valleys, he said. The 
general perspective was that Man is an evolutionary being who has to adjust. “The ones who 
do not adjust will die,” Michael argued. Peter did not worry about CC, but about what lies 
behind it, what he termed a not-sustainable economy. He talked about the increasing world 
population, global injustice and that developing and newly industrialised countries are 
demanding their “place in the world”. These social factors are scarier for him than CC itself. 
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Peter did not believe that the consequences will affect himself during his lifetime. He 
nevertheless believed that it will affect his children, and that for them it may become difficult 
– again not because of climate change, but because of the immense inequalities between rich 
and poor in the world. 
F. The strategy of the company 
The German and Norwegian companies all claimed that they had a climate strategy, but the 
design of it varied considerably between the countries. All the German energy companies had 
an agenda for informing their employees, either with large information campaigns or 
information in inter- and intranet. Two of the German interviewees reported that there are 
major discussions within the company around the topic. “Everybody should know about it, 
because the firm is a major emitting unity,” Simon said. One of the German companies did 
not have a large program for informing the whole company, but they have a group which 
meets and discusses regularly. 
Not all Norwegian companies were that far when it came to informing their 
employees, but they said they are working on it. Some mentioned that they had, or planned to 
have, arrangements to inform their employees, where they for example would invite lecturers. 
The Norwegian companies also had measures to reduce emissions on the work place, and 
mentioned electric cars and energy efficient office buildings. The German energy companies 
did not have programs to encourage climate protection and energy saving at the work place. 
The German interviewees explained that this was because the amount of CO2 emissions from 
their office activities is negligible compared to the emissions from the company’s main 
activity – energy production. Therefore, their strategy and focus is to improve the standards 
within the electricity production. Because, as Simon stated: “We do not want to do green 
washing, we want it to be serious”.  
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7 Discussion 
My first research question aims primarily at examining perceptions of the climate change 
situation. To bring out the interviewees’ perception, I asked them questions that touched upon 
several aspects of climate change (CC) including climate policy, scientific findings and 
consequences for personal life and behaviour. In chapter six, the climate perceptions found in 
the empirical field study corresponding to research question 1 and 2 were presented. In this 
chapter, I analyse different aspects of these findings and discuss possible explanations for 
how and why climate perceptions varied as they did in the sample. As mentioned in chapter 3, 
I operate with an extended notion of perception. It includes changes in natural environment as 
well as the companies’ climate strategies. Section 7.1 accounts for the main findings related to 
research question 1. Here I discuss the climate perceptions that I found in the different groups 
of institutions, and point at in what respect climate perception varied with groups, nations and 
gender. I also discuss variances that occurred within the respective groups. Section 7.2 
investigates the findings related to the second research question, as it examines what 
implication the interviewees’ climate perception had for their conception of personal 
responsibility and behaviour. The next section 7.3 recapitulates the findings from the 
historical part in chapter five, and is hence a response on the third research question, which 
endeavours at examining inter-linkages between public and private actors within the 
Norwegian and German energy sectors. Finally in 7.4 I discuss possible explanations for why 
the different groups held the climate perceptions that they did. The finding that the 
interviewees’ climate perception diverged according to their group belonging was a result of 
this thesis’ exploratory research design, and was not directly addressed in any of the three 
research questions. In order to explain the distinctive group features, I first of all draw on the 
findings from the Local Research Frontiers and underpin them with institutional theory and 
rational choice theory.  
7.1 Climate perceptions 
As stated in chapter one, the assumption behind the formulation of the primary research 
question is that perceptions matters for how people eventually act, in line with “the Thomas’ 
theorem”: If man defines situations as real, they are real in their consequences (Collins 
1994:261). George from the public/energy group reacted about the way I formulated the 
questions during the interview, as I several times used the term believe during the interview. 
Among other things, I asked the interviewees whether they believe the climate predictions are 
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real or whether the national climate politics will lead to increased emissions. George argued 
that it was not a question of believing or not, but about scientific methodology. He taught me 
a lesson about scientific modelling and argued that a computer model can never simulate 
nature because of nature’s complexity. In his opinion, IPCC’s predictions were not something 
you could believe are true or false, they are simply mathematical models. George is of course 
right about that there is no final truth about the climate situation, at least not (available) for us 
human beings. The simple fact that the respondents in the study were so varied about this 
topic illustrates this very clearly. My point is nevertheless that these beliefs are important to 
the degree that they do have effectual consequences – both personal and political.49  
7.1.1 Group more important than nationality 
What appeared as the most striking result of the empirical research was that the Norwegian 
and German interviewees were tending to have the same opinions, values, arguments and 
beliefs about CC according to their working institution, here exemplified through their group 
belonging. In sum, group and sector belonging was more important for the interviewees’ CC 
perception than their nationality (see chapter 6). Even though there were variances within the 
groups (see chapter 7.1.2), this was the major tendency that could be identified in course of 
process of organising and analysing the material.  
The fact that the perception of climate change could be analysed according to group 
rather to a nationality or public-private distinction was surprising and unexpected. It was also 
unexpected that employees within the public sector were sceptic towards the IPCC’s 
predictions and the national climate/energy policy. As IPCC is the basis for the national 
climate policy and strategies, I expected that it was commonly accepted as a credible 
information source. Instead, the interviewees in the public/energy group proved to be largely 
critical towards the problem of CC. Their views were contrary to the views of both the 
public/environmental group and the private sector. The public/environmental group was the 
most idealistic and convinced that ambitious climate aims were possible to carry through. The 
interviewees in the private group shared the climate perceptions of the public/environmental 
group to a large degree as they believed that CC is a problem and expressed the necessity for 
action. The fact that employees within the same institution and in institutions with similar 
business and activity areas hold similar perceptions on certain topics correspond with the 
assumptions of institutional theory and earlier research findings on the energy sector (see 
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 By personal I mean behaviour in the private sphere, by political I mean structural measures developed and 
implemented by law or binding resolution. 
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chapter 2.2). Institutional theory opens up for analysing institutions as a collective acting 
coherently, which makes it possible to treat institutions as political actors. This thesis’ main 
finding is that individuals within the same institutions and similar types of institutions have 
similar norms, interests and identities related to the topic of CC. Further, that the climate 
perceptions are approximately the same within the same groups in Norway and Germany. 
Thus, the distinction in perception of CC between the groups in my case study is more 
important than that between Norway and Germany. This is true even though Norway and 
Germany are quite different countries with very different energy systems and structures (see 
chapter 4). There are also remarkable disparities in their climate policies and abatement 
targets. The two countries are nevertheless similar in the respect that they both have a strong 
energy bureaucracy. Both the Norwegian and German energy sectors are characterised by 
close connection and extended interaction between state institutions and commercial 
enterprises (see chapter 5). The findings from my empirical study seem to implicate that the 
culture within the public energy segments is more important for their member’s perceptions 
than the national policies.  
7.1.2 Varieties within groups 
I have argued that the main differences were those between the groups. It would nevertheless 
be wrong to treat each group as one unified voice. When I speak about the perceptions and 
opinions of each group, I mean the main tendency within the group. It is on the one side the 
concrete arguments that the majority of respondents in each group used to justify their 
opinion, but also whether the interviewees were optimistic or pessimistic towards the different 
topics in general. In some groups, there were notable discrepancies between the respondents.  
The interviewees in the public groups were not as unified as the interviewees in the private 
group. The most dispersed group was the Norwegian public/energy group, of which half of 
the respondents were sceptical about CC, and the other half said they believed in the general 
statements from the IPCC. The latter nevertheless stressed that they did not have the 
qualifications to judge the validity of the IPCC’s predictions, and would therefore not say 
whether they believed they were realistic. They further did not believe it was possible to 
stabilise CO2 emissions on the aspired 450 ppm
50
 and hence mitigate CC unless there was a 
technological breakthrough or an immense natural catastrophe. In both respects, the 
“believers” within the Norwegian public/energy group opposed the public/environmental 
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 The quantified target of the IPCC in order to stabilise the global temperature increase at 2 degrees Celsius. 
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groups in both countries. Regardless of whether they trusted the IPCC or not, the respondents 
in the public/energy group expressed scepticism towards the possibility – and the efforts made 
– of reducing emissions nationally. Many of them were also very pessimistic about the global 
potential and chances to mitigate CC.  
 I have argued that the opinion of the public/environmental group was opposing that of 
the public/energy group with regard to the feasibility of the national climate policy’s aims and 
measures. This is also a generalisation of the main tendency within each group. The majority 
of the public/environmental group were convinced that the emission reductions was possible 
with today’s technology, but there were respondents in each country who doubted this 
because of time pressure and the quantity of the reduction aims. I would still argue that it is 
reasonable to distinguish between the public/energy and public/environmental group. The 
reason is that the interviewees in the environmental groups all argued that it was positive and 
necessary to set ambitious aims – even though they did not believe that the aims would be 
possible to attain. One interviewee from the public/environmental group also started out as 
optimistic but turned pessimistic in course of the conversation. The respondents in the 
public/energy group combined pessimism towards emission reduction with scepticism toward 
the whole climate policy and /or topic in general. 
 The private group was the most unified. The Norwegian private group showed small 
variations in terms of degree of worry and in their characterisation of the climate policy. The 
majority of this group expressed that they thought the prognoses are conservative, because 
they hear from other sources that the development in reality is going faster. But there was also 
one (Ted) who neutrally stated that he holds IPCCs prognoses to be credible and that he had 
no qualifications to judge whether they are conservative or not. Those who believed IPCC’s 
prognoses to be conservative were more worried and expressed larger dissatisfaction with the 
national climate policy than Ted. The private group varied most notably in terms of what 
strategies the companies were heading at. This distinction could be identified between the 
countries, and will be accounted for in the following section. 
7.1.3 Varieties between Norway and Germany 
Some differences in climate perception between the two countries could be identified. In this 
section, I elaborate on the issues that were objects of the main discrepancies between Norway 
and Germany. These are the worry category, strategies of the private sector and the fact that 
some of the German respondents talked about CC in a system context. 
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Worry 
The most striking difference between Norwegians and Germans in all groups was that the 
Norwegians who took CC seriously expressed severe concern about its consequences. In 
Germany, there were very few who said that they were personally worried. This applies to 
both those who consider CC as a problem, and those who do not. Only three out of ten 
Germans expressed that “what climate change globally might bring” made them worried. 
Several of the German interviewees laughed as the question “Do you worry?” came up. “For 
me personally? Oh no, not at all!” some of them replied. The most important reason for not 
worrying was that the Germans were much more convinced that CC will not affect them 
physically where they live. Many of the German respondents argued that in general, the 
Germans find climate change great because of the warmer weather. Some of the respondents 
did not worry because of their perception of man’s way of coping with problems. As Simon 
put it: “Man is so innovative that he will always find answers to such new challenges. He may 
have to ready to leave beloved things behind and make some sacrifices, but he will manage to 
survive.” Michael also used evolutionary arguments to state the reason why he did not fear 
climate change: 
My attitude is that we humans are evolutionary beings. If the environment changes 
the human beings have to adapt. The ones who do not will have to die; it is a 
process of selection. Either I evolve further as human being and learn that some 
things are impossible to stop and then I will more or less be able to get along.  
This was different in Norway. The Norwegian respondents that perceived CC as a problem 
also express serious worry. Thomas argued that “it can run out of control, and the world may 
become totally different”. In contrast to the Germans, they mentioned that they also worry 
about the consequences of rising temperatures where they live and about the future for their 
children. It is interesting that the Germans are less worried than the Norwegians. According to 
IPCC’s predictions, Norway is not supposed to fare worse than Germany with respect to the 
consequences of climate change (see chapter 4.2). In terms of political action, the German 
climate policy is more comprehensive than the Norwegian which might implicate that the 
Germans perceive the problem as more serious than the Norwegians. Germany has a 
considerable environmental movement and is famous for its environmental consciousness. 
The German Green Party was represented in the Government from 1998-2005, and Germany 
was therefore the first country in the world with an influential Green Party. The Norwegians 
are on their side also famous as a “nature people”. Wilderness life and outdoor activities is 
regarded as part of the Norwegian folk spirit – even though wilderness tourism first started in 
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the end of the 19
th
 century. Grenstad et al. (2006) nevertheless argue that the golden age of 
environmentalism in Norway was the years 1970 to 1975, when the Norwegian environmental 
movement was claimed to be the strongest in Europe. After that, member numbers and 
engagement have varied with the field’s position/role on the agenda. The Norwegian 
environmental movement has nevertheless criticised the Norwegian Government for 
presenting itself as very environmental friendly abroad, whereas it is not very good at carrying 
through sufficient measures at home. Because of Norway’s geographical conditions, the 
Norwegians have always been very exposed to weather (and climate), and Norwegians are in 
general much occupied with the weather. In 2006, two world champion cross country skiers 
founded the climate organisation “hvit vinter” (white winter), whose main objective was to 
secure the future skiing conditions in Norway. Almost all Norwegian interviewees mentioned 
that it would be a pity if it will not be possible to go skiing in the future.  
Different degrees of worry may nevertheless not only be a result of the diverging 
expectations of climate change’s effectual consequences. It may also be connected to the 
conditions under which Germans and Norwegians are living. Even though both countries are 
affluent industrial countries, there is be little doubt about that the Germans have been 
enduring far more hardship than the Norwegians the past 100 years. Both World Wars, which 
left Germany in ruins 1945, and the following cold war when Germany was squeezed between 
the fronts of the USSR and the USA, affected Germany to a totally different degree than 
Norway. Compared to these threats and catastrophes, the threat of climate change may appear 
insignificantly small, at least in terms of changed weather patterns. This may also be the 
reason why the German interviewees emphasised that climate policy is peace policy 
interviewees to a larger degree than the Norwegian. Many of the Germans said they did not 
fear climate change in itself, but the consequences it may have.
51
 As Simon from the private 
group put it; “The most important aspect of it is our peace. All kind of climate policy must 
hence take justice of distribution into consideration.” 
Another explanation for discrepancies in degree of worry between Norway and 
Germany can be connected to the gender distribution of my sample. The research sample was 
gathered exclusively based on the interviewees’ expertise and position in the institution. 
Because I chose the persons according to their professional positions, I did not have the 
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 It is, of course, difficult to distinguish between the fear of CC in itself and its consequences, as climate change 
is its consequences. This was nevertheless how the interviewees expressed themselves, and I think one must 
understand it as the division between a changed natural environment and the social consequences here above all 
related to political instabilities. 
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possibility to balance the men-women ratio. This resulted in a very different gender mix in the 
two countries. In Norway, the interviewees were half men and half women, whereas in 
Germany I only interviewed one woman. This side effect may to a certain degree reflect the 
gender situation in both countries. The Norwegian state has played an active role in 
integrating women in the working life, and has achieved one of the highest rates of female 
employment in the world together with Denmark and Sweden. The policy was closely 
connected to the development of a comprehensive welfare state. I will not account for this 
development within the frames of this thesis.  
The unequal gender distribution may nevertheless have implications for the fact that 
the Norwegians were more worried than the Germans. Previous research has found that 
women are more convinced that climate change is occurring and feels threatened about it 
(Weber 2008). In my sample, all women said that they considered IPCC as a serious research 
panel. Four out of five Norwegian women clearly answered “yes, I am” on the question 
whether they were worried about climate change. The four Norwegian women who said that 
they worry were all mentioning the future of their children as a matter of concern. This also 
corresponds with results from earlier studies which have shown that women and respondents 
with many children fear an increase in extreme weather phenomena the most (Weber 2008).  
It is also striking that all interviewees in the Norwegian environmental group were 
women. I will not speculate about whether these interviewees were climate believers because 
they were women or because of their institutional belonging – or both. But it may be the case 
that women apply for jobs in environmentalist institutions because of their environmental 
consciousness. This would support the recruiting hypothesis that the institutions hold different 
norms, values and beliefs because of the type of persons who wants to work there. I elaborate 
on this in chapter 7.4.1. 
The strategies of the private sector 
Another area where Germany and Norway divert from each other was how private companies 
reacted upon CC. Except for smaller variations within the country as well, the main difference 
was that most of the Norwegians combined business measures with measures on the 
workplace, in contrast to the Germans that focused on measures within their core activities; 
energy production. The German private group claimed that what they do in the sphere of 
production has far larger consequences than how they travel or heat their offices. Therefore, 
their focus is on the former. “What cars we drive is [a topic] for the media - for us, it has 
nothing to do with climate protection. For other companies this is different, but this holds for 
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the energy industry in generally” (Peter). The Norwegian companies do not agree with this: 
“Even though the effect is much larger when you do something in your production, it does not 
allow you to neglect what you do in your office” (Elisa). The Norwegians described different 
measures that their company has undertaken within office and administration activities. 
On the other hand, the Germans told me that CC was a very important and widely debated 
topic within the firm, and I was given the impression that this was a top-down strategy, as it 
was an aim of the management that the employees were thoroughly informed on the topic: 
“The climate discussion that takes place in our company is very well-founded” (Simon). In 
Norway, not all the firms had corresponding agendas for informing employees about climate 
related topics, and one respondent described their effort as insufficient.  
One explanation for these discrepancies may be that the German companies are 
exposed to criticism to a larger degree than the Norwegian in this respect. The German energy 
companies present in my sample have hard coal, lignite and/or nuclear energy production as 
their core activity. In Norway, the sample was composed of hydropower and oil producers. 
The environmental movement in Germany has termed the coal and lignite power plants 
“Klimakiller”52, and there have been several cases where activists have occupied sites of 
construction for new power plants. The German energy companies have also met extensive 
critique for their lobby activity towards the bureaucracy and for their dominance over the 
German power grid (see chapter 5). The German employees are therefore subject to 
substantial pressure, and have to be prepared to meet criticism from several directions. In 
Norway, there has also been resistance against the building of new gas power plants
53
, and 
Norwegian involvement in the construction of large scale dams for hydropower production 
abroad has been criticised both nationally and abroad
54
. I have not conducted a systematic 
comparison of the opposition against the energy business in Norway and Germany. The over 
mentioned factors would nevertheless implicate that the German energy sector is more 
unpopular than the Norwegian. It is probably also connected to the fact that the Norwegian 
hydropower activity is less a climate issue than coal and lignite based energy production in 
Germany.  
The Germans and the System 
During some of the interviews, topics or aspects of the climate change situation came up that 
were not addressed directly in my interview guide. This was intended and a result of my 
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choice of a semi-structured interview guide in order to shed light on as many aspects of the 
climate perception as possible. It nevertheless has the consequence that all interviewees did 
not receive the same questions. Some of the interviewees were telling a lot more compared to 
others who were either in short of time or very restrictive in their utterances. The question of 
political and societal system was one such topic. I mention this because I think it was 
interesting that several of the German respondents brought up this aspect.  
Three of the German interviewees, all from the public sector, brought up the need or 
possibility for a change in the societal system. George argued that it was impossible to say 
anything about the consequences of climate change for Germany, because it depends on what 
economic situation we will have in Germany and the World in the future. George was certain 
that the current system will change: 
 One day or another, the system is going to change. Therefore, we have to relate the 
natural changes to a system, which we do not know at all what will look like. […] 
As I assume that the changes will occur at a time when many of our society’s 
boundary conditions have changed, it is impossible to foresee the natural 
consequences of climate change, in my opinion.” 
Bill and Paulina both argued that the capitalist system was part of the problem. According to 
the German economist Altvater (2005) is capitalism based on growth which can only continue 
with increasing energy consumption. Neither Bill nor Paulina presented other systems that 
would do better – on the contrary, Bill was eager to stress that socialist systems had not 
proven better in protecting the environment. They simply pointed out that to cope with the 
roots of the problem of CC, a change in political and economic system would be necessary. 
Bill predicted that new political systems would develop as a consequence of lacking energy 
resources.  
None of the Norwegian interviewees were questioning the current political or 
economical system. A possible explanation the Germans brought up this topic could be that 
Germany’s history is one of two different political systems. The importance of the current 
political system is probably more evident in Germany as the situation in East and West 
Germany was very different in 1990 – and certainly still is. The fact that the Germans has 
experienced such dramatic changes within short time has maybe contributed to increased 
awareness that political systems are not nature-given but a result of intended human action. 
The German sociologist Beck (1995) has described the contemporary environmental problems 
as not being solely an environmental problem, but a side effect of the modern society’s ways 
of production: „The transformation of unexpected side effects of industrial production in the 
global ecological hot spots is not a problem of the environment – no so-called environmental 
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problem – but a profound institutional crisis in the industrial age of national states” (my 
translation). 
7.2 Personal responsibility and behaviour 
The second research question implies the investigation of climate perception’s impact for 
personal behaviour. What perception each interviewee had of the individual’s role and of 
personal responsibility and behaviour when it came to abating GHGs was largely influenced 
by what perception the person posited of the problem’s character and gravity. As the latter 
varied immensely between the different groups (see chapter 6), I met correspondingly 
dispersed views on responsibility and comprehension of what they as individuals can and 
should do in their private lives.  
As mentioned earlier, this topic is problematic to investigate. Its importance is also 
disputed. According to previous research (see chapter 3), lifestyles and consumption in 
private households are among the fastest growing causes for environmental damage and 
resource use. This suggests that it is necessary to elaborate more in-depth on the topic. In spite 
of the methodological problems connected to gathering data on personal behaviour accounted 
for in chapter 3, I experienced that I obtained substantial information about the interviewees’ 
climate behaviour through their more or less comprehensive narratives. Their statements 
related to behaviour and responsibility also served to illuminate their climate perceptions 
further and reinforce the distinctions between the three groups of institutions.  
One of the most interesting findings from the empirical study concerning personal 
responsibility was the answers from the public/environmental group. Even though I did not 
ask in detail about what each person did at home, most of the interviewees in the 
public/environmental group gave accounts for this. Many of them were eager to tell me about 
the many possibilities each person has, and argued that there is a large potential within this 
area. It was obvious that many of them had thought a lot about this topic. They all saw it as 
each individual’s responsibility to do something, but shared the opinion that there are still 
many obstacles which has to be overcome within the energy system. One of them even 
claimed that personal behaviour is the main issue when it comes to mitigating CC. He was 
personally upset about the way everybody travels around the world without minding the 
climate, and claimed that he did not travel by plane himself for private reasons.  
The findings from my field work implicate that climate consciousness and engagement 
among the respondents in the public/environmental group apparently do matter for how these 
persons behave and act. Many of them have succeeded in undertaking private emission 
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reductions. In my opinion, the fact that these respondents hold the perception that individuals 
can make a difference when it comes to coping with the problem is interesting in itself, as it 
opposes the “what I do personally does not matter anyway”-attitude presented in attitude B 
(see chapter 3). The findings also contrasts the main conclusion of Hovden’s study (see 
chapter 3), which states that households with high environmental consciousness do not have a 
lower energy and resource use and hence a more environmentally friendly lifestyle. Hovden 
nevertheless acknowledges the importance of environmentalists’ attitudes and engagement as 
necessary for the changing political structures into being more environmental friendly. This 
was also advocated for by respondents in the public/environmental group. Both Clara and 
Paulina claimed the individual’s most important contribution to climate protection was 
through their voting behaviour. My findings nevertheless indicate that personal abatement 
effort is possible and can complement voting behaviour.  
In contrast to the public/environmental group, the public/energy group was sceptical 
about allocating too much responsibility on the individual. First of all, the majority in the 
public/energy group claimed that individuals will not make the GHG emissions decline, either 
because it does not make any difference or because of man’s nature (see below). Many of 
them expressed that they had always been using energy consciously. They therefore did not 
find it necessary to focus particularly on reducing GHG emissions. On the contrary, many of 
them found such an attitude rather ridiculous. Chris stated that he is not like the people from 
green communities who go by bike because of environmental reasons: “I go by bike of 
egoistic reasons because I want to stir myself to keep healthy“.   
The private group was somewhere in between. These respondents were obviously 
more concerned with climate change in their daily lives than the energy group. Most of them 
had reflected substantially on what they could do personally and undertaken some measures. 
They nevertheless expressed a less idealistic attitude than the environmental group, and were 
not as eager to tell about the individual’s possibilities as the public/environmental group. The 
majority of the group promoted the point of view that even though each one of us has a 
responsibility, the main part lies with the political and social structures. The individual’s role 
is rather to set a good example, but personal behaviour will not be sufficient to combat 
climate change.    
7.2.1 Human nature 
In some interviews, the questions concerning personal responsibility disclosed perceptions of 
human nature. Alex expressed that the reason why global emissions and energy consumption 
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would not decline, was because human beings always “want to maximise their self-interest”. 
There was one question in my interview guide which asked if the interviewee could think of 
anything he would have done in his private life to reduce GHG emissions if he had more 
money. Alex replied that if he had more money he would probably not buy an energy efficient 
house, but “a bigger house, some more cottages (hytter) and the like”. His answer was 
obviously ironic, but he argued that “this is they way it is, this is what people spend their 
money on”. Eric said that “if you have the attitude that energy efficiency is necessary, I agree 
that in the end it will be the individual who makes sure that this happens. I just do not think 
that will happen. I suppose we humans are a little to far away from those things”. 
It would be very interesting to investigate the connection between perception of CC and 
the more basic perception of human nature, as the latter were apparently important 
explanatory factors for the respondents’ intentional and actual behaviour in my case. To 
examine on this topic further is a large task and outside the scope of this thesis, as I have 
chosen to focus more on the historical and institutional aspects of the Norwegian and German 
energy sectors. 
7.3 Public-private connections 
Chapter 5 of this thesis is dedicated to the review of the historical development of the energy 
sector. This is in line with the idea of explanation-based theory, according to which social 
science only seeks regularities that are situated in specific contexts. In line with the 
assumptions of the theory of segmented state, I have investigated a tiny part of the energy 
segment in both countries. My empirical study endorses the point of view that the 
public/energy group and the public/environmental group can be regarded as different 
segments that stand in opposition to each other. This is also in line with the theory of 
segmented state, which states that the main dividing lines in politics goes between the 
different fields around which a segment emerges (Reitan & Stigen, 2001).  
The account made in chapter 5 revealed that there has been close inter-linkages 
between state and industry actors in both Norway and Germany since the energy sectors’ 
origin at the end of the 19
th
 century. In both Norway and Germany, state institutions have for 
a long time not only co-operated with the energy companies, but been responsible for the 
sectors development. The state was also major shareholder in most of the energy companies. 
After a comprehensive liberalisation of the energy sector in both countries, and for Germany’s 
case privatisation during the 1980s and 1990s, the state’s role towards the energy companies 
was gradually reduced to that of indirect steering. In Norway, the large energy companies 
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operate as independent multinational companies despite continued state ownership, and the 
state’s task has turned into that of being a stockholder. In one respect, state and market has 
thus separated compared to what was the case in the sector’s origin. On the other hand, the 
account for the public-private co-operation in the Norwegian and German energy sectors 
disclose that state and industry representatives still meet in different forums on a more 
informal level. The communication between the two is apparently well nurtured. These 
findings would implicate that public and private actors belong to the same segment, as they 
share some basic values and perceptions and work towards the same aims.  
The theory of the segmented state would therefore implicate coinciding perceptions of 
CC within public and private energy institutions. As showed in chapter 6, this is not the case. 
Instead, my empirical findings suggest that these institutions possess remarkable different 
climate perceptions when it comes to causes, consequences, mitigation possibilities, policies 
and worries. As mentioned, the respondents from the public/energy group were more sceptical 
about CC than the private sector, which had accepted CC as a serious problem. A possible 
explanation for this may be found in the strategy of business and industry actors in the climate 
negotiations accounted for above. Even though the private sector appears as climate believers 
in my empirical part, Vormedal’s study argues that this has not always been the case. If one 
assumes that the public/energy and private group belong to the same segment, the 
public/energy group would probably have been highly influenced of the lobby activity 
working against climate regulation in the 1990s. Because of the inertia that characterises 
bureaucratic institutions (Weber 1978), it may be the case that the anti-climate mentality that 
dominated the energy segment before the Kyoto protocol was signed have remained within 
the public/energy group up to now. The fact that Torben from the Norwegian public/energy 
group mentioned that he used to be a climate sceptic would fit into such a theory. Torben told 
me that he had been sceptical about the predictions of climate change until short time ago. 
The reason he had changed his opinion was not the IPCC reports, but the fact that he observed 
that the weather patterns in Norway are changing.  
The findings from chapter 5 indicated that parts of the private sector still lobby for and 
distribute attitudes in the climate’s disfavour. If this is true, the climate scepticism within the 
public energy bureaucracy would not only be the repercussions of private sector’s previous 
activity, but also the result of current influence.  
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7.4 Explaining distinct group features 
I now enter further into the discussion of what might explain different aspects to the climate 
perceptions identified within the different groups. The explanations will be discussed group 
by group. 
7.4.1 The public/environmental group 
The climate perceptions within the public/environmental group were mainly in line with the 
official stand of Norwegian and German authorities. In this section, I discuss one possible 
explanation for why the public/environmental group was the group that was the least sceptical 
about CC. 
Sharing view of the environmental movement 
The interviewees from this group in both countries mainly argued in line with the spokesmen 
from the IPCC and the environmental movement. Even though the latter is composed of a 
diversity of organisations, which support different measures and different strategies, they 
largely work towards the same aims: stronger restrictions on GHG emissions, development of 
renewable energy, increased energy efficiency and eventually a structural change into a 
sustainable energy system. As accounted for in chapter 4.1, Norway and Germany are both 
characterised by comprehensive environmental movements.  
 The results from my empirical study reveal that the public environmental bureaucracy 
largely shares the argument and perspectives of the (political) environmental movements. One 
explanation for this may be the recruitment of employees into the public/environmental 
institutions. According to Gundersen (1991:22-23), there was a professionalisation of the 
Norwegian environmental movement in the 1970s, as environmental activists were recruited 
into a fast expanding public environmental bureaucracy.
55
 This implies that the environmental 
field was co-opted early by the state (Grenstad et al. 2006:39). It also had the consequence 
that the environmental movement lost followers from the 1970s to the 1980s. A similar 
recruiting of staff from environmental organisation into Governmental bodies may be the case 
for Germany too, as their major public environmental institutions were founded in the same 
period.
56
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The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment was founded in 1972 and the Norwegian Pollution Agency in 
1974. 
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 The German Federal Environment Agency was established in 1974, and the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety in 1986. 
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The connection between the environmental bureaucracy and non-Governmental 
organisations (NGO) was endorsed in my empirical study as several representatives from the 
public/environmental group stated that one of the most important things the individual could 
do “in the fight for the climate” was to become a member of either an environmental NGO or 
a political party and hence address the problem through political channels.  
 Reitan & Stigen (2001) point to the fact that the development of climate policy in 
Norway was characterised by conflicts between different parts of the public bureaucracy. This 
finding also supports the theory of the segmented state when the environmental and energy 
sector are perceived as opposing segments.  
7.4.2 The Private Group  
The private group was unified in their perception of CC as a serious problem. In this section I 
will discuss two possible explanations for this.  
Corporate Social Responsibility  
The notion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) became increasingly important in the 
focus on sustainable development within the United Nation system. The concept emphasises 
that business are expected to account for social and ecological performance, and take such 
issues into account in business decisions and operations (WBCSD 2006). Because my 
empirical of varying climate perceptions between the public/energy and private group point in 
a different direction of previous research, which document extensive interaction between the 
two, it would be a tempting speculation to ask whether the “political correct” climate 
perception within the private sector in both countries is simply a result of the companies’ 
public relation (PR)-strategies.  
Many non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) have raised such critique of mainly 
multinational companies from different sectors. They argue that the CSR agenda with focus 
on corporate self-regulation is nothing but a PR-exercise and “green-washing” (Greer & 
Bruno 1996). To interpret my findings as such would imply that my interviewees in private 
sector were not telling the truth. I have no reason or intention to make such an assumption. 
My impression was on the contrary that the interviewees in the private sector were all 
seriously – and more or less idealistically – engaged in making their business more 
environmentally and climate friendly. This is also supported by Jelstad’s findings from the 
study of Statoil’s CRS strategy (See chapter 2.3). She argues that even though the company’s 
environmental strategy was first of all a result of formal demands from the authorities, 
 93 
internal pressure from employees was also a factor that made the Executive Board change its 
attitude. To find out to what extent the climate strategies of the private companies have had 
actual consequences is outside the frames of this thesis. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
respondents in the private group were persons engaged in climate and/or renewable energy 
policy issues in their respective companies, which may be crucial for their climate 
perceptions. Because some of the energy companies still earn their living on climate harmful 
activities, it may also be the case that some of their employees or their interest organisations 
still lobby in favour of these interests even though the company has accepted the issue of 
climate change as real. Ytreberg’s journalism (see chapter 5.3.2) gives support to such an 
interpretation.  
The role of business and industry in the climate negotiations 
Vormedal (2008) and Greer & Bruno (1996) argue that the behaviour and strategy of the 
private sector can be explained with theories of profit maximising based on a rational choice 
calculations rather than with notions of values and norms within the firms. According to 
Vormedal, it is well documented that business has played an important role in the 
development of new agreements in the climate negotiations (Vormedal 2008:36). Vormedal 
has studied the role and influence of business and industry NGOs in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). She found that business actors, 
organised in what she terms business and industry NGOs (BINGOs), changed their strategy 
from the early 1990s when the climate negotiations started, and to the turn of century when 
the Kyoto protocol had been signed and ratified.  
The engagement of business and industry in the negotiations started out dominated by 
the fossil-fuel lobby, mainly organised through the Global Climate Coalition, which was an 
organisation advocating anti-mitigation and regulation. Its efforts to obstruct and delay the 
negotiations for a climate agreement are well documented (Vormedal 2008). By the beginning 
of the new millennium, the BINGO constituency had grown and diversified, and so had also 
its mandates and strategies. Starting out as being exclusively sceptical towards the problem of 
Climate Change per se, and thus working hard to sabotage the development of an international 
climate agreement, a considerable part of the business and industry lobby changed their 
motivation into being more or less pro-climate change. The Global Climate Coalition was 
disbanded in 2002 after several of its core members such as British Petroleum, Shell and 
General Motors left the organisation in the wake of the Kyoto protocol. The reason was that 
the companies felt they could no longer be associated with the organisation’s aggressive anti-
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climate stance. Today, the mandates and activities of BINGOs range from strong opposition 
to support and pro-regulation lobbyism. The motivation for this turn in climate change 
perception from the business point of view can be illustrated by this quotation from the 
secretariat of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a 
prominent BINGO that explicitly endorses the need for GHG regulation and international 
frameworks: “If you are a smart CEO57 these days you will realise that climate change issues 
will have a big impact on your future business. So you might as well get involved right from 
the beginning. A lot of companies that are around today will not be around in 50 years, 
because they didn’t manage to respond to a different economic environment which will be 
shaped by sustainable development issues.” 
The “greening” of business and industry, exemplified through their NGOs can hence 
be explained with the companies’ rational risk calculations for changed market conditions in 
the future. In contrast to the public bureaucracy, the private companies have to think 
progressively and act innovative with regards to what might happen in the future in order to 
remain competitive. After the signing and ratification of the Kyoto protocol, the most rational 
strategy for the companies was to accept climate change as a problem. The expected change 
in market conditions consists not only of the consumers’ and civil society’s increasing 
demand for climate friendliness. It is first of all a question about the anticipated future market 
regulation. A rational strategy for business actors are hence to try to influence the 
development and design of future agreements and regulations so that it will be in accordance 
with their own activity and survival. Because the Kyoto protocol’s main mechanisms are 
market based
58
, business and industry actors have come to play an important role as advisers 
when new climate negotiations and its regulation systems are designed. Business and industry 
– for-profit organisations – are hence above all acting in line with strict profit maximising 
logic, best explained by rational choice theory’s conception of social actors as rationally 
calculating actors that strive to maximise their own utility.  
7.4.3 The public/energy group 
The public/energy group was the group that most notably stood out from the other groups. As 
mentioned above, this group drew the issue of CC in doubt. I now discuss two possible 
explanations for that.  
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 Chief Executive Officer 
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 The main mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol are the Emission Trading Scheme, Joint Implementation and the 
Clean Development Mechanism. 
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Dissatisfaction with climate policy 
The main reasons for disagreement were that the interviewees in the public/energy group – 
either partly or fully found that the climate policy was 1) unnecessary – because climate 
change is not a problem or the problem is not that serious 2) useless because it does not make 
any difference in a global perspective anyway 3) over-expensive 4) arbitrary because it does 
not follow a co-ordinated and reasonable plan, and 5) populist as it focuses on particular – and 
often insignificant measures – which gains a lot of attention in the media.  
 The findings implicate that there may be a socialisation effect of belonging to the 
public/energy group, which is similar in Norway and Germany and hence independent of the 
countries’ different energy profiles. This may be related to the position of the energy 
bureaucracy in both countries and its importance for the national economy (see chapter 5). 
The energy bureaucracy is old compared to the environmental bureaucracy and characterised 
by strong hierarchical structures. The closeness to industry actors accounted for in chapter 5 
and 7.2 may also be factors explaining the conservativeness of the energy bureaucracy. It is 
important here to repeat that I cannot conclude anything on the basis of my limited sample. 
The climate scepticism within the energy bureaucracy could be an interesting hypothesis for 
further investigation. 
The character of the problem 
Another possible explanation is linked to the nature and scope of the problem of climate 
change. Coping with CC means changing material structures and social perceptions, on all 
levels of governance and in a wide range of forums; private as well as public, political as well 
as civil. When one looks at the diverging opinions about the feasibility stopping climate 
change, it is clear that the challenges connected to this task are immense. 
Many of the interviewees in the public/energy group were people that are responsible 
for executing the energy policy passed by the politicians. Some are in charge of the 
implementation of new and amended laws, and they are experts within their working field. In 
this regard, they have first hand knowledge about the difficulties connected to the 
achievement of the national aims of emission reductions, because they actually have to find 
out how specific reductions are to be carried through. Many of the respondents from the 
public/energy group in both countries express that achieving the policy aims would mean vast 
interventions in the society. They foresee that such a policy will become very expensive and 
also influence other parts of the society – above all different parts of the industry – to such a 
degree that they doubt the population will accept it/agree upon it. This may therefore be an 
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alternative or additional explanation for why this group is less convinced about IPCC’s 
predictions. If the situation really is to become as bad as the IPCC foresee, it may be very 
difficult and tiring to be daily confronted with the impossibility of preventing it. There is 
much research that implies that individuals distance themselves from certain information to 
maintain coherent meaning systems (Gecas & Burke, 1995 in Norgaard (2003)). The “denial” 
of the problem among the energy policy experts would be in line with the perspectival 
selectivity that Norgaard found in her study of how lay people in Norway were coping with 
CC (see 2.1.1). Norgaard argues that Norwegian economic prosperity and way of life is 
intimately tied to the production of oil. She therefore identifies the ignorance of the issue of 
CC as a collectively organised denial which serves to maintain Norwegian global economic 
interests and perpetuate global environmental injustice. Altvater extends this hypothesis and 
perceives the economic prosperity of the entire industrialised part of the world as tied to the 
production and combustion of fossil and nuclear fuels (Altvater 2005). Both Germany and 
Norway are enjoying remarkable wealth in a global perspective through activities that causes 
huge GHG emissions. The petroleum production in Norway has made national stabilisation of 
CO2 emissions next to impossible (Hovden and Lindseth (2002) in Norgaard (2006)). If one 
accepts Norgaard’s and Altvater’s arguments, one could interpret the rejection of perceiving 
CC as anthropocentric and IPCC’s credibility as necessary for the respondents in the 
public/energy group to be able to continue their professional activity as usual. 
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8 Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated perceptions of climate change among leaders in the Norwegian 
and German energy sector, and the relationship between climate perceptions and personal 
behaviour. Climate change (CC) is a huge topic that affects many parts of the society. It is as 
much a societal as a natural problem. The contextual parts of this thesis have contributed to 
illustrate the importance of the energy sector in the effort to cope with CC. Norway and 
Germany show considerable differences in the organisation of their energy structures and 
have to meet the reduction obligations with different strategies. However, it is true for both 
countries that public authorities have an important task to develop favourable framework 
conditions if comprehensive emission reductions shall become feasible. The historical review 
of public-private inter-linkages in both countries’ energy sectors made clear that the 
contemporary design of the energy sector is to a large extent a result of the role of public 
authorities. The choice of comprehensive state presence in the energy sector was an intended 
political decision, and the mentality behind German Energy Industry Law of 1935, which 
stated that “the consumption of energy is in the interest of the common welfare and to avoid 
damaging economic effects of competition”, has been the dominating in the Norwegian 
development as well. 
The first research question aimed at investigating climate perceptions among leaders in 
Norwegian and German energy sector. The empirical study carried out in this thesis shows 
that there is no uniform perception either of the threat of climate change or of its solutions. 
One major finding was that the respondents’ climate perceptions could be organised 
according to the type of energy institution they worked at. The same was true for the second 
research question, which investigated the relation between climate perception and personal 
behaviour. Starting out with a research design and methodology that emphasised the personal 
aspect of climate change on the micro level, the thesis’ main findings are hence of a macro 
character as they stress the importance of political structures and institutional cultures. This is 
as much a result of the thesis’ exploratory research design as of the empirical findings 
themselves.  
8.1 Drawing on institutional theory 
The thesis has presented and related itself to several theoretical positions, of which 
explanation-based and institutional theory were the most important. Explanation-based theory 
emphasises that social phenomena should be analysed in their context. Chapter four and five 
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were therefore dedicated to two macro level context chapters. The former accounted for 
national energy and climate polices and illustrated the challenges connected to reduction of 
GHG both nationally and globally. Both Norway and Germany are facing the problem of CC 
with national climate policies. However, the German policy is much more ambitious than the 
Norwegian, above all in respect of development of renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
despite the fact that Norway’s potential for development of RES is alleged to be much bigger 
than Germany’s. Chapter five was dedicated to the third research question and endeavoured at 
giving an account of inter-linkages between public and private actors in the energy sector 
since the sectors origin in the 19
th
 century up to current date. The main contributions of this 
chapter were firstly, to illustrate that the state has played a crucial role for the historical 
development of Germany and Norway’s energy sector and secondly, to shed light on the high 
degree of cooperation between public and private actors within the sector. Both contributions 
give support to institutional theory. The first contribution points to the fact that institutions 
matter in the making of policy. The second may serve as an illustration of the Norwegian 
branch of institutional theory occupied with policy networks, i.e. the theory of segmented 
state, where a segment is defined as the field of actors which emerges around a specific type 
of industry policy or function. The close cooperation between state and industry actors in the 
energy sector accounted for in chapter five indicates that these actors belong to the same 
segment.  
 Institutional theory might also explain the most striking result from the thesis’ 
empirical study. By taking on an institutional approach, one regards institutions as arenas for 
contending social forces, and as collections of standard operating procedures and structures 
that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs. This could explain the 
fact that the interviewees’ climate perceptions varied according to institutional – exemplified 
by group – belonging. On the other hand, the empirical findings divert from the assumption of 
the segmented state, as the public/energy and private group represented opposing climate 
perceptions. One possible explanation for this may be the role of business and industry in the 
climate negotiations. Previous research has shown that private actors turned from being 
climate sceptical and lobbying against the creation of binding negotiations into being pro-
climate after the signing of the Kyoto protocol.  
8.2 Huge variations in climate perceptions  
There were several interesting results from the empirical study. First of all, there were larger 
differences between climate perceptions between institutions than between the two countries, 
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despite the fact that Norway and Germany differ largely in respect of their energy systems and 
of their climate policies. In order to maintain the demand for anonymity, the institutions 
represented in the sample were divided into three groups, according to which the findings 
were analysed. The groups were called the public/energy, public/environmental and the 
private group. The first consisted of institutions mainly occupied with what I call traditional 
energy, defined as fossil, nuclear and large scale hydro energy. The second group consisted of 
institutions whose area of responsibility is also energy production, but directed towards the 
development of renewable energy. The private group consisted of private energy companies, 
whose core business activity is traditional energy production.  
The interviewees from the public/energy group stood out as partly or completely 
sceptical towards the scientific community’s prognoses and publications on CC.59 Some of 
them doubted the current findings of the dominating climate research, and argued that they 
did not believe that CC is happening because of human activity or that it will be as bad as the 
researchers predict. The public/energy group was very pessimistic about the potential for 
attaining the national emission reduction aims, and critical towards the current climate policy 
in their respective countries. Because most members of the public/energy group did not 
believe in the malignity of CC, they did not worry about CC personally. Nor did they see the 
need for undertaking measures to reduce personal impact on global CC. The prevailing 
opinions was rather that a) it did not matter what they did personally anyway because of the 
scope of the problem, b) it was useless to address personal responsibility because most people 
just want to maximise their own utility and/or c) they did not know what they could do 
themselves to become more climate friendly.  
 In contrast to the public/energy group, the public/environmental group was unified in 
their perception of CC as a huge and serious problem. They expressed their worry and gave 
detailed explanations on how each individual could reduce the emission of GHG and what 
they had done themselves in this area. They were also convinced that even though national 
climate and energy policies are ambitious, they are feasible and necessary. Many of them 
pointed to the responsibility industrial countries have to reduce emissions nationally, and 
expressed the attitude that we “have to take our turn” in order to be credible and also to stand 
out as a good example for the international community.  
 The private group was the group that showed the largest differences between Norway 
and Germany. The Norwegians in this group were far more concerned about the problem than 
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 Exemplified by the IPCC’s 4th assessment report (IPCC 2007a). 
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the Germans, who hardly feared CC personally at all. However the members of the private 
group shared the general opinion that CC is a problem and represents a huge challenge for our 
society, according to which their companies react with more or less comprehensive strategies. 
The interviewees in this group were not as idealistic about efforts to reduce GHG emissions in 
their private life as the public/environmental group, but they had either undertaken some 
measures or were considering it. 
8.3 Implications of the findings 
The motivation behind the thesis’ research questions was illustrated by the two attitudes 
discussed in chapter three: A) Many people will not take action to reduce GHG emissions 
personally because they regard it the responsibility of state and industry actors and B) “What I 
do does not matter for the climate anyway”. It was certainly the case that these attitudes could 
be identified among a considerable part of the sample.  
Attitude B was the dominating opinion among the interviews in the public/energy 
group. As discussed in chapter three, Hardin (1968) points at how this attitude may contribute 
to the destruction of a public good. Attitude A serves to emphasise the importance of the 
political action further, as it illustrates that political actors not only are responsible for policy 
making, but serve as a model for the population. When the institutional culture within parts of 
the public energy bureaucracy is sceptical about climate change, this might represent an 
obstacle for a comprehensive change in the current energy systems into a more “climate 
friendly” one.  
The review of Norwegian and German official climate policies nevertheless shows that 
the German policy for developing RES is more ambitious than the Norwegian. One could 
therefore say that the climate scepticism identified within parts of the German bureaucracy 
does not obstruct the RES policy. I would nevertheless argue that such an interpretation would 
be wrong. The RES development is only one part of Germany’s combined energy and climate 
policy. The future – and even more ambitious – reduction targets will include interventions in 
a much wider range of areas within energy policy. The German interviewees within the 
public/energy group argued that it will not be possible to carry out such comprehensive 
emission reductions. Following institutional theory, which asserts the importance of 
institutions in the making of policy, it might be expected that it will be very difficult to 
achieve the prescribed goals if reluctance against them persists within the public institutions.  
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8.4 Concluding remarks 
According to Schreyer & Mez (2008), the barriers for developing RES are manifold and well 
documented. In their study about the feasibility of establishing a European Society for 
Renewable Energy, they claim that the obstacles are of economic, technical as well as 
administrative character. Among the most important challenges are the competitiveness of 
RES, the problems connected to storing renewably produced energy and comprehensive 
bureaucratic procedures. The findings of this thesis nevertheless suggest that parts of the 
energy bureaucracy are rather sceptical about CC per se and climate policy aims and 
measures. The historical review made in chapter five illustrated that the state has played a 
central role in the energy sectors’ development in both countries. In Norway, this is true 
especially for the development of hydropower plants, transmission grids and investment in the 
petroleum sector. In Germany, public funding has been crucial for the maintenance of hard 
coal production and the introduction of new technologies like nuclear power and in recent 
years; new renewable energy sources. The successful development of RES in Germany serves 
an example about the importance of favourable public policy conditions. 
  Institutional theory stresses the importance of institutions within the making of politics 
as they see policies as conspicuously influenced by the institutional structure within which 
policies occurs. If this assumption is accepted, the sceptical climate perceptions identified 
among individuals within the public/energy institutions may be an additional point in 
Schreyer & Mez’ account of barriers for development of RES.  
This has been an exploratory study, with few interviews and limited scope for 
generalisation. To investigate whether its findings are valid for the institutions in general – 
and the extent to which they represents an obstacle for a change into a renewable energy 
system – would require further and more comprehensive research on the topic.  
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Appendix A: Interview guide 
National level 
1. What do you think about the last prognoses from the scientists of the IPCC? 
2. What do you think will be the consequences of CC for Germany/Norway (dependent 
on whether the interviewee was German or Norwegian). (Consequences for the natural 
environment and the society were added if necessary.) 
3. What do you think about the German/Norwegian Government’s current climate 
policy? 
4. How do you consider the chances of the German/Norwegian society to reduce its 
emissions with 40% (Germany) or 20% (Norway) within 2020? 
5. Do you think the Government’s GHG emission reduction targets are reasonable in 
relation to the anticipated threat of CC?  
6. What do you think about the adopted measures of the Government in relation to the 
reduction targets? 
7. What will the energy mix in Germany/Norway look like in 2030? 
 
Corporate level 
8. Is there a program or strategy in your institution to inform the employees about CC – 
for example to invite scientists, arrange conferences and others? 
9. Does your institution have a program or strategy to facilitate and encourage climate 
protection on the work place? 
 
Personal level 
10. In the debate about CC it is often discussed who has the responsibility to mitigate CC. 
How much responsibility would you say each individual has in order to reduce GHG 
emissions?  
11. TIME Magazine had last year (April 2006) a cover page with the headline: “Be 
worried. Be very worried.” Would you say that you worry about CC? Or feel 
threatened by it? 
12. (eventually) What do you think about the public debate about CC? 
13. What changes will climate change bring about in your personal life? 
14. Do you think people in your surroundings have changed their behaviour because of the 
threat of CC? How? 
15. Have you changed anything yourself? 
16. Is there anything you would have done in order to reduce emissions in your personal 
life if you had more financial resources available? 
17. Would you be prepared to abstain from anything out of consideration for the climate? 
Under what conditions? 
18. What are in your opinion the largest obstacles for mitigating CC? 
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Appendix B: The TIME Magazine cover page, April 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
